Relations between the kings and nobility of Sassanid Persia by Carey, James Robert Daniel
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/842
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
Relations  between  The  Kings  and  Nobility 
of  Sassanid  Persia
by
Jam es  R obert D an ie l C arey   B .A .
A Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements 
for the Degree of
M aste r O f A rts  In  C lass ics
U nivers ity  o f W arw ick
Department of Classics and Ancient History
S ep tem ber  2008
C O N T E N T S
List of maps i     
Summary ii 
Introduction 3
Chapter I – The Early Years: Ardashir I to Kavad 27
Chapter II – The Reign of Khusrau I 62
Chapter III – The Later Years: Hormizd IV to Yazdgird III 84
Conclusion 124
Bibliography 131
L I S T   O F   M A P S
i
Map 1  The Near East in late antiquity        1
Map 2 The southern theatre of war (Mesopotamia and 
surrounding regions) 
2
S U M M A R Y
The following thesis is an investigation into the nature of the relationship between 
the  (‘King of Kings’) of Sassanid Persia and their chief subjects, with 
particular focus on the period from the end of the fifth century until the middle of the 
seventh. The intent is to contribute an understanding of the manner in which this 
relationship did or did not change during the period in question. The primary 
materials used have been the literary sources that remain extant, particularly the 
work of al-Tabari, but also those of the various Roman and Byzantine writers where 
appropriate. 
Although it would have been possible to treat the subject in a thematic manner, it 
was simpler to lay it out in a chronological fashion. In accordance with this, each of 
the three chapters corresponds with a period of Sassanid history. The introduction is 
concerned with the source material and its relevance to the question at hand. The 
first chapter investigates the years from the accession of Ardashir I to the death of 
Kavad. The second focuses on the reforms of Khusrau I and their relevance to the 
relationship while the final chapter continues until the fall of the Empire to the 
Muslim invaders. The conclusion then ties all of the previous chapters together and 
concludes the argument. 
The principal contention, as set out in the second and third chapters in addition to the 
conclusion, is that there was no measurable alteration to the relationship between the 
 and their nobles caused by the reforms of Khusrau I, nor did it appear 
to alter substantially during the entirety of the Empire. The evidence bears this out, 
both that of the Arabic sources and the Byzantine writers.
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­
Shahanshahs
Shahanshahs
1
2
3I N T R O D U C T I O N
There is a distinct lack of source material for the Sassanid Empire, even going by the 
standards of the late antique period as a whole, which has large gaps in a multitude 
of areas. This lack is particularly noticeable when it comes to the internal affairs of 
the Sassanid dynasty and the methods by which the kingdom operated.  Thus it is 
necessary to take small pieces of information from a number of separate sources, 
many of which are at least one degree removed from the original events, whether by 
time or space. It is perhaps debateable which of the two is preferable or more useful. 
In any case, the principle sources for the Sassanid dynasty are a number of Roman or 
Byzantine histories, the  of Ferdowsi, the work of al-Tabari, and a variety 
of works by Syrian or Armenian authors that straddle the divide between the two 
great powers of the time.
While there is a paucity of sources for internal affairs during the entirety of the 
Sassanid period, this is most clearly a problem during the early and middle periods 
of the dynasty. While Procopius occasionally gives the historian a snapshot or 
vignette into what he heard of Persian affairs, the same cannot be said for Ammianus 
Marcellinus, who forms our key source for the bulk of the fourth century. And, for 
all of his faults, it would have been helpful had the extant portion of his work 
included the preceding century, for even less has survived to the present day from 
that period. There, the Graeco-Roman tradition is limited to a small selection of 
references in Malalas and other sources. 
­
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4Fortunately, there are some mitigating factors. As with all of the Sassanid period, al-
Tabari and the  provide some coverage, although the value of their 
accounts vary. Neither mentions Kartir, one of the more important figures of the 
period by name, and Tabari’s accounts of the shorter reigns is often brief to the point 
of containing little information beyond their genealogy and the length of their reign. 
This is also true of the accounts in the . Beyond this, the period has two 
additional resources to offer that later periods do not. One, although it is 
comparatively limited in its scope, is the corpus of Manichaean writings, particularly 
those relating to the life of Mani. The other, the rock reliefs that adorn the walls of 
Naqsh-i Rustam amongst other places, provide a uniquely Persian perspective on the 
period, showing the  in the way that he wished to be seen, both by his 
own subjects and by outsiders. 
However, there is still a large problem in that, without the grand narrative sources in 
the mould of Procopius or Ammianus for the third century, there is almost nothing to 
be said with any degree of certainty about the internal politics of the Sassanid 
dynasty. It is not until the end of the third century that any other major Persian 
leaders can be identified from the textual sources and then there is a gap until 
Ammianus fills it with his account of the campaign of Julian. Individuals do appear 
from time to time by name or by title, but there is almost nothing concrete to be said 
regarding how the Persian (and Parthian) nobility interacted with themselves or the 
. 
One exception might be a passage from the  by 
Agathangelos, who stated that Ardashir met with ‘the magnates of the Persians and 
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5Assyrians’, specifically identifying them as different from the Parthians. However, 
one of the magnates later sent to the Parthian king Artabanus is a certain Carinas or 
Karen, a member of what were later called the ‘Seven Parthian Clans’, similar to the 
House of Suren.1 This would suggest that the Parthian nobility, or at least some of 
them, quickly came to the decision that it would be better to support Ardashir than 
the Arsacids, and acted on that. However, without any corroborating evidence other 
than the appearances of the House of Karen in Sassanid inscriptions as one of the 
great noble families, this is merely speculation. As one of the few times we can 
positively identify Persian nobility in the early years, it remains necessary 
speculation.
Beyond the woeful lack of evidence, there are a variety of problems with what we do 
have, ranging from those that are common to any ancient source, from Herodotus 
through to Procopius, to issues specific to a particular author. One notable problem is 
that ancient writers, as well of those of the Middle Ages, had a different view to 
writing history than modern authors. The truth was not always an end in itself; 
instead the purpose of certain works was to make a point, usually about morality, to 
the readers. This is particularly true of Roman writers and can most readily be seen 
in those of the early Principate, such as Tacitus, who used the acts of the Julio-
Claudian rulers to show how the rule of one man inevitably slipped into despotism 
and tyranny. Given that Ammianus Marcellinus, the lengthiest writer of the fourth 
century whose work is almost explicitly a continuation of the work of Tacitus, used 
much the same model in his history, one might reasonably suppose that the format 
had stood the test of time intact. Matthews questioned this link in his work, but noted 
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6that there is a strong link to Sallust in ‘Ammianus’ conception of the ‘dignity and 
character’ of Roman history’2 which still suggests that Ammianus had access to a 
traditional style of writing that informed his own methods. This is as likely to be true 
of the historians writing in Greek, and the very nature of al-Tabari’s writing style in 
the later books with the use of , or chains of narrators, to convey information. 
A further problem with most source material is the issue of errors in the copying 
process. This is not a particular problem in this thesis, as such errors are most often 
found regarding numbers, but it is a potential flaw in any source where the original 
manuscript is not extant. 
The most obvious issue is that of priorities, however. While this will be touched 
upon in more detail in the individual analyses of the sources, it is important to 
consider it as an overall issue as well. It is partly linked to the differing 
methodology, but here it is a case of the writers of the time not being particularly 
interested in the information that a modern audience would need. This often involves 
information that the audience at the time would have been aware of, but that a 
modern reader, even a historian who specialises in the area, does not have at their 
disposal. This can lead to misinterpretation of the information in question, or to the 
historian being forced to speculate about it. In regard to Sassanid Persia, this is true 
far more often than is comfortable. 
Even where the information is available, the histories written are often centred 
around one particular element or thread that informs the writer’s choice of what 
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7material to include and what to leave out. A familiar example might be the focus that 
Ammianus Marcellinus maintains on the career of his hero Julian the Apostate in the 
relevant books of his work. Of course, as Emperor, it would only be natural for the 
spotlight to be on Julian, but even in the earlier years of his life, Julian is the 
principle interest of Ammianus’ work. In many ways, his story is the tragedy that 
Ammianus is attempting to reproduce, in a way that mimics the format of a Greek 
tragedy.
This leads directly to another difference. While modern history is concerned with the 
analysis of past events, ancient historians were sometimes more concerned with the 
literary merits of their work and the moral to be drawn from this than the precise 
truth, although it is not universally true by any means. The traditional example of 
this is the speeches so beloved of many ancient authors. In most cases, we are not 
able to determine whether these words are what where actually spoken by the 
general or politician in question, a summary of the speech, mostly accurate but 
framed in the words of the author or whether it is purely the invention of the writer 
with no input from any other source. To this, we must add the complication that, 
even when the author was intending to stay true to the speech that was made, there is 
often no indication that they have written evidence or anything other than their own 
memory to go by. This would not be a problem if they were writing immediately 
after the speech was made, but this does not seem to have been true of the majority 
of writers if any. An example might be Thucydides, who was writing during the war 
that was the subject of his writing, or Procopius, who had some direct experience of 
the events that he described. On the other hand, there were those like Herodotus or 
Tacitus who wrote sometime after the events that they described and relied primarily 
8on evidence provided to them by eyewitnesses. Not all are helpful enough to tell us 
specifically where they received their information (the Arabic sources are an 
exception in this regard although some of the Roman and Byzantine writers name 
their sources). Still, it is sometimes possible to determine where they have directly 
taken text from another source but this does not always help when the original source 
is no longer in existence. In particular there are some sources where it is impossible 
to speak of the reliability of the source as a whole. Instead it is necessary to take each 
piece of information on its own merits. 
One method of looking at this subject might be to consider truth to be a spectrum. At 
one end, there were writers such as Thucydides who are faithful to the truth as they 
heard it. They reported the facts directly, with comparatively little interpolation of 
their own opinions or interpretations. In that way, they were the closest to the 
modern ideal of history, although even these have flaws from a present-day 
perspective, due to the occasional assumption of knowledge that has been lost. At the 
other end, however, are to be found Agathias and those authors like him. These, for a 
variety of reasons, were entirely unreliable when it came to the facts of which they 
wrote.
Worse still, it was a common literary device to avow that a particular work would be 
different from all the others in some way, whether it be in faithfulness to the truth or 
in some other fashion. A good example of this is the passage with which Procopius 
begins his :3
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9It was his conviction that while cleverness is appropriate to rhetoric, and 
inventiveness to poetry, truth alone is appropriate to history. In accordance 
with this principle he has not concealed the failures of even his most intimate 
acquaintances, but has written down with complete accuracy everything 
which befell those concerned, whether it happened to be done well or ill by 
them.
Even were it not for the fact that this comment is exactly the sort that he purports to 
find inappropriate for history, as it appears to be based more on cleverness than the 
truth, the sequel would have proved it inaccurate. Given that Procopius later wrote 
another work commonly known as the , within which he purports to 
reveal all of the secrets that he could not disclose in his “official” history, one or the 
other statement is decidedly wrong. As such, it appears unlikely that either claim is 
true, and it is important to be wary of any such claim where it cannot be supported 
by substantial evidence.
To conclude this introduction, there is a particular section from the work of 
Thucydides that frames his view of his own methodology:4   
In this history I have made use of set speeches some of which were delivered 
just before and others during the war. I have found it difficult to remember 
the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my 
various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has 
been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words 
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that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was 
called for in each situation. 
And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of the war I have made 
it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and not even
to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present myself at 
the events which I have described or else I heard of them from eyewitnesses 
whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible. Not 
that even so the truth was easy to discover: different eyewitnesses give 
different accounts of the same events, speaking out of partiality for one side 
or the other or else from imperfect memories. And it may well be that my 
history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it of a romantic 
element. It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are 
judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which 
happened in the past and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some 
time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future. My work 
is not a piece of writing designed to meet the taste of an immediate public, 
but was done to last forever.
This should show the reader why it is that Thucydides is regarded by many as the 
first true historian. However, it also shows why it is impossible to trust any ancient 
source fully – even with the best will in the world and a commitment to the truth, 
most were relying on word of mouth and the stories of eyewitnesses, sometimes 
years after the event. 
11
The information that is provided in the source is the key to its usefulness, above even 
the reliability or lack thereof. It is usually possible to sort the truth, or the probable 
truth, from the fiction within a source, but if the information is not present, then a 
historian is reduced to conjecture. It is unfortunate that, for the majority of the early 
period of the Sassanid dynasty, it is to conjecture that a historian is reduced to fill in 
the gaps that exist between the sources. The late fifth century through to the end of 
the empire has the most ample material to survive, with a variety to compare and 
contrast. This allows for some sifting to determine the most likely course of events, 
and given the wide disparity in both the date and location of writing for the 
contemporary (or near contemporary) literature and the later Arabic tradition, there is 
little danger of direct crossover between them. Indeed, following the end of the last 
war between the empires in 628, Byzantine writers are of little use regarding Persian 
affairs, particularly by the time of the Arab invasions. They have affairs of more 
immediate interest – namely the internal affairs of their own empire. Unfortunately, 
it is at this point that the Arab sources become more and more unreliable when it 
comes to the details of events, with such unlikely stories as that in al-Tabari stating 
in his account of the battle of Nihawand that ‘the Persians went forth, having 
fastened themselves to one another with chains so that they could not flee’.5 In his 
earlier account of the battle of al-Qadisiyyah, he said much the same – ‘[the 
Persians] bound themselves with chains’.6 Finally, a similar note is made of the 
battle of Yarmuk regarding the Byzantine infantry.7 This is a notable example, 
although the numbers given for the Persian army are suspect as well – one of the 
 said that there were one hundred and twenty thousand Persians at the battle. 
We have other accounts of the strength of Persian armies such as at Dara when 
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7 Al-Tabari 2089.
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Procopius gave the figure of forty thousand8 or a similar number for the army that 
Bahram Chobin brought to oppose the returning Khusrau II and his Byzantine 
supporters from Theophylact.9 Given that similar numbers are quoted for Roman and 
Byzantine armies, it is likely that this was the average size for an army operating in 
the eastern theatre. At al-Qadisiyyah, there were thirty thousand Muslims according 
to al-Tabari,10 and it is perhaps more accurate to suppose that there were between 
thirty and sixty thousand Persians. 
More specific to this thesis is the quantity of information that we are given on 
internal affairs in Persia. Obviously, this varied from text to text, but the overall 
quantity is regrettably low. Once again, this is often determined by the interest of the 
writer in Persia as anything more than the equivalent of the generic villain. A 
particularly good example is Ammianus Marcellinus, who, despite being the most 
complete history of the fourth century to survive, tells us almost nothing about the 
internal politics of Persia. He gave us the names of a handful of Persian nobility alive 
at the time but that is all. He has a summary of Persia as a country that does not need 
to be repeated here, but which is a mixture of fact and fiction, which hardly adds to 
our knowledge of Persian society.11 In short, despite being the key source for the 
Roman side of the frontier, Ammianus remains almost useless for the purposes of 
this thesis. He is overshadowed by the later sources, such as Menander Protector, 
who may be fragmentary, but still provides more information, let alone Procopius.
                                                  
8 Procopius  I.13.23.
9 Theophylact V.9.5.
10 Al-Tabari 2222.
11 Ammianus Marcellinus XXIII.6.75-84.
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One consideration is that the writers of the third and fourth centuries had not had the 
experience with Persia that those of later years had. As such, it is possible that they 
still viewed them as no better than the Parthians who preceded them. Certainly, those 
writers also had other areas of the empire to consider. Therefore it is logical that the 
Byzantine authors, for whom Persia was a looming presence to the east, would be 
more interested in writing about the great enemy and they had also had more 
experience of how the Persians were closer to their empire in status than any other 
nation. Thus, the change from Persians as merely the enemy in Ammianus to the 
Persians as individuals and personalities in their own right in later works is not as 
surprising as one might think. 
While it is true that there is a small amount of useful source material surviving, it is 
spread across a large number of different texts. Therefore it would be impossible to
analyse them all with the attention that they deserve in the space available.
For the sake of ease, I will briefly summarise the sources by period. The 
and al-Tabari cover the entire Sassanid dynasty. Other than these two, the third 
century is covered only by fragmentary works, as is the fourth century with the 
exception of Ammianus Marcellinus. Various fragments take us through the fifth 
century until we join Procopius in the sixth century. Following his conclusion, 
Menander Protector, Theophylact and then Sebeos conclude the century and lead 
through the last war between the Byzantines and the Sassanids, until we are left with 
only al-Tabari and the  to see out the last years of the dynasty. These, of 
course, are not the only texts to survive – there are also a number of ecclesiastical 
histories covering the later period to varying degrees of accuracy, some 
Shahnameh
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 and works such as the . On the other hand, they are the 
primary ones for their period, however fragmentary or lacking in useful information 
they may be. In the earlier period in particular, often there is no other option. It is for 
this reason that the majority of the thesis will focus on the later period, from the end 
of the fifth century onwards, because there is sufficient material to make discussion 
of the nobility and their relationship with the  meaningful. For the first 
two or three centuries, it is much harder although there are some specific instances 
and individuals that will be dealt with.
Next must come the reliability of the information that is provided in the works we 
have. While the details of this discussion will be kept in the individual chapters, so 
that material is quoted close to the debate in question, it is useful to discuss it as a 
general rule here as well. 
The closest text to a contemporary Persian source that remains extant is the 
, or Book of Kings. It was written by the poet Abolqasem Ferdowsi (940-
1020) in the late tenth and early eleventh centuries and tells the story of Iran before 
the Islamic invasions, from Kayumars, the first king, to Yazdgird III, the last king.12
As a source, it is not often used by historians for direct research, possibly because of 
its obvious faults discussed below, but it has merit at times for comparison with al-
Tabari and other Arabic sources, as they all are part of the 
tradition, dating back to the Pahlavi Book of Lords.13 In addition, it is the closest 
surviving work to any Persian tradition, and thus merits some consideration on that 
basis. The primary use for it comes in comparison with other sources or traditions.
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However, there are some considerable issues that mean it should not be trusted as a 
source on its own, nor should it be rated above the works of historians. Regardless of 
the accuracy in parts, it remains a partly mythical history of Iran since the earliest 
days. While the mythology is most prevalent in the early parts, it remains present in 
the latter era, such as the use of sorcerers by Saveh Shah when he fought against 
Bahram Chobin.14 Equally, even when this is not the case, the Persian tradition that 
makes it a useful source can also be a problem. This is primarily because, while it 
seems to be originally based upon the archives of the Sassanid kings and the basic 
structure of the individual stories may be sound, there is the chance that they have 
become influenced at a later point by the process of being passed along from one 
generation to the next.15 As neither the original archives nor the 
are extant, there is no way to check it. Again, while the reports of the more 
contemporary sources – such as Theophylact or Sebeos – paint Bahram Chobin 
either in neutral terms16 or as a wicked usurper17 according to preference, the 
 made him the perfect example of Persian nobility, the knight beyond 
reproach until he was tainted by greed.18 Another interesting passage is that dealing 
with Khusrau II and his queen Shirin. It is written more in the style of a romance 
than of a history, focussing on the relationship than on the history of the empire to 
the degree that the war of 602-628 is hardly mentioned. Nevertheless, despite its 
downfalls as a source, it does provide us with a useful window on the majesty of the 
Persian court as it was seen in later years.
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Abu Ja’far Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari (839-923) wrote his History of Prophets 
and Kings ( ) before the composition of the , 
and it is the most extensive history of the period, stretching from the Creation of the 
World to 915.19 Much of the work covers the Islamic period from the 620s to the 
end, with all but the first five volumes of the translation20 relating to this period, and 
of those only one refers to the Sassanids, beginning with the accession of Ardashir I 
and ending with Yazdgird III, the last king. His reign is covered in more detail in the 
chapters relating to the Islamic invasions themselves. 
Al-Tabari was a Persian Muslim born in Tabaristan, what is now northern Iran. His 
work is notable for being one of the few works to give a historian an insight into the 
internal workings of Sassanid Persia, and it seems to be reliable as a rule. However, 
this does not mean that it is without its problems. These come mostly, as one would 
expect, towards the end of the narrative relating to the Sassanid empire, particularly 
in those areas dealing with the Arab invasions, but also in earlier sections. As 
Howard-Johnston said of al-Tabari’s coverage of the ‘Last Great War of Antiquity’: 
‘hindsight has played on his account’.21 The closer to the end, the more likely it is 
that al-Tabari’s focus will be drawn to the south – there is a break in the midst of his 
account of the reign of Khusrau I to discuss the history of Hira22 that takes up a 
substantial quantity of text, for example, or his digression to discuss the birth of 
                                                  
19 Rosenthal 1989.
20 This is a device of the translators, but it remains useful for separating out the relevant sections of 
the work.
21 Howard-Johnston 2006: 7.
22 Al-Tabari 900-958.
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Mohammed.23 Further, in the sections dealing with the last war, he did not mention 
the Turks that assisted the Byzantines in the fighting in the north of Persia.24
Although they are not strictly a literary source, there are a number of rock reliefs, 
particularly at Naqsh-i Rustam, carved by order of the early Sassanid , 
which depict particular events in their reigns. The most famous are those of Shapur I, 
which show his triumphs over the emperors Gordian, Philip and Valerian. While the 
reliefs appear to have fallen out of fashion at the end of the third century, the 
surviving ones remain extremely useful as something with which to compare the 
Roman sources of the time. They are also important in so much as they show us how 
the  wished to be seen by their subjects – as skilled warriors and 
hunters. Shapur I is portrayed as being on horseback in full royal regalia while his 
Roman enemies cower and bow before him. 
In addition, one set of inscriptions in particular ought to be mentioned. This is the set 
carved by order of Kartir, the  at the end of the third century. His 
writings are a guide to his career, and are perhaps the only carving such as this not to 
be by order of a member of the royal family. While the inscription itself is not 
particularly useful for the purpose of this thesis, Kartir himself is. As such, while it 
would be unwise to take his words at face value, for they are often clearly intended 
to play up his power and authority in ways that do not always mesh with the other 
extant writings, they do fill an important niche in Sassanid historiography. 
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While the two most famous branches of the historical record are the Islamic and the 
Roman-Byzantine traditions, there is also a third one that essentially straddles the 
gap between the two. That tradition could be divided into two branches, one of 
which can be described as an Armenian one, split as that country was between the 
two great powers of the time, with the other as Syriac. Both traditions are valuable 
additions to the corpus of material – they are often closer to the events that they 
described than the later Muslim sources, but they are close enough to Persia to be 
both interested and aware of the internal affairs. As such, works such as the history 
of Sebeos or the  can provide historians with information 
lacking for whatever reason in the Byzantine sources. 
One of the most useful works from this area is the history traditionally attributed to 
Sebeos, often supposed to have been an Armenian bishop known to have been 
present at the council of Dvin in 645, but the true identity of the author remains a 
mystery.25 The history began with the reign of Peroz (459-484) and continued on 
until after the end of the Sassanid dynasty although the bulk of the narrative begins 
in the reign of Hormizd IV and focuses on his son and successor Khusrau II. It is 
primarily focussed on events in Persia and Armenia, although the Byzantine Empire 
is also mentioned frequently, particularly after the Muslim invasions and elsewhere 
when it related to the events in Persia or Armenia. 
Procopius of Caesarea (c500-c554/56226) was the legal advisor and secretary to 
Belisarius, military commander of the armies of Justinian. He accompanied 
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Belisarius on many of his campaigns, and this experience forms the basis for his 
work. There are three texts extant – the , the  which is 
better known today as the  and , which covers the 
buildings that Justinian built during his reign. 
The relevant work for this thesis is the , or specifically books I, II 
and VIII. The first two books cover the Persian wars up to 549, while the eighth 
takes it through to around 552. The other books dealt with the other wars that 
Belisarius waged on behalf of Justinian, and do not add anything related to this 
thesis. These books are perhaps the most useful material available for the period. Not 
only does Procopius seem to have had an interest in affairs in Persia, he was in a 
position at times to learn of the details as Belisarius’ advisor. 
However, this may not be as much of an advantage as it might appear. As Cameron 
discussed in her book on the topic, the relationship between Procopius and Belisarius 
may have prompted him to write the history of the Persian campaign as it affected 
his patron with less than perfect honesty. In particular, one might consider the first 
period when Belisarius was on the eastern frontier, when his failures at Callinicum 
and Nisibis considerably outweighed his success at Dara, something to which 
Procopius does not devote much time compared to his successes. In addition, 
Cameron felt that the three works should be seen together as part of a greater whole, 
based on references between them. Given the proven unreliability of parts of the 
 with its picture of Justinian as a malicious and demonic figure and the 
equally twisted portrayal of the emperor and his wife (much maligned in the 
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) in the , it is unlikely that the  are entirely safe from the 
same problem. Unfortunately, as Cameron also notes, Procopius is often the only 
source for large parts of the reign of Justinian and is frankly too useful to discard 
entirely. In addition, while his account of the fall of Kavad is flawed, this does not 
appear to be true of the bulk of his work.
There are, however, other sources for parts of the reign of Khusrau I, although they 
have issues of their own to be considered. Two of these are the work of Menander 
 and the account of Agathias. Agathias, who wrote his history of the reign 
of Justinian at some point in the middle of the sixth century, regarded his work as a 
continuation of that of Procopius.27 There are two elements within it of particular 
interest for historians of Sassanid Persia. The first is an excursus on Zoroastrianism 
beginning at II.25. This is of limited use for the present thesis, however, and so we 
come to the second. Here, Agathias wrote an account of the reigns of the Sassanid 
kings up to his own day, using what appears to have been access to the archives of 
the dynasty itself.28 This is exceedingly valuable, for it is the closest that we have to 
a Sassanid version of history. The next most modern accounts are those in the 
 and the Arabic tradition, both of which are at least one incarnation 
distant from the original material. 
However, there are substantial problems with Agathias as well, which moderate the 
benefits of his access to the uncorrupted annals. The most obvious is the traditional 
bias of western writers towards the Persians, as can be seen in Agathias’ comments 
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on Khusrau’s image as a philosopher-king.29 Whether this bias was present or not 
would be irrelevant if Agathias had simply taken material from the annals. He did 
not, and inserted his own comments based on observations and opinions. Thus it is 
necessary to attempt to determine which evidence originated from the archives and 
which was inserted by Agathias himself to fill in a gap. Cameron attempted to do 
this in her article on the subject, and puts it thus – ‘Both excursuses mix in with the 
hard information a quantity of decoration and moralizing provided by Agathias 
himself’.30 Fortunately, the latter account is far less prone to the addition of western 
sources, rendering it far more valuable than its religious cousin. On the other hand, 
this allows for a more insidious problem. Agathias did not apparently gather his 
material from the archives directly. Instead he relied upon Sergius, his ‘immediate 
source’31 and, as Cameron put it, ‘if Sergius misrepresented his material Agathias 
had no way of knowing’.32 It would be redundant to reproduce Cameron’s work here 
in full, so I will conclude by stating how unfortunate it is that a source with such 
potential should be effectively contaminated by ‘an author who had only the 
remotest... idea of the real worth of his material, and even less of the right way to use 
it’.33
A further concern with the entirety of Agathias’ work was noted by Kaldellis. He 
questions whether Agathias even thought of himself as a historian.34 He indicates 
examples of Agathias as a lawyer and as a poet, but also as a philosopher and a 
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scholar.35 The quote that Kaldellis brought up – ‘that the purpose of history is to 
promote the teachings of ‘political philosophy’ by dressing them in pleasant garb’36
– is not likely to gladden the heart of a modern historian and indeed is a problem 
remarked upon above. It is particularly unfortunate here, for, rather than merely 
placing a particular interpretation upon events, Agathias appears to have invented 
them wholesale when it suited his purposes.37 While, as Kaldellis again states, this is 
indicative of Agathias’ literary skill, it is a nightmare for a historian with the primary 
concern of disentangling reliable facts from the morass of literary motifs. Regardless 
of the reasoning for this, Agathias cannot be regarded as a reliable source without 
some form of confirmation from another writer. It is tragic, considering the potential 
that his work held, but, again, it is an indication of the gap between the purpose and 
audience for which his writings were intended and the use to which we are putting 
them.
The second of the two, Menander, wrote in the reign of Maurice and claimed to be 
following in the footsteps of Agathias.38 His work though is significantly more 
reliable and useful where it survives. Sadly, much of it has been lost and only 
fragments remain. In addition, there has been little work done on them by 
comparison. Blockley wrote a translation with some commentary and Baldwin an 
article, although there are a few studies in other languages.39 Nevertheless, Menander 
preserved a wealth of information, and it is regrettable that more of it did not 
survive. Again, his primary value is concerning the reign of Khusrau I, and it lies 
mostly in the Persian nobles that interacted with the Byzantines in the frontier 
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regions. The  himself remained mostly a distant figure, while emissaries 
and generals provided a face for the Persian enemy. 
Unlike the secretary Procopius or the lawyer Agathias (although Menander claimed 
to have been trained as a lawyer), he was not concerned with taking up a particular 
career.40
But I did not take up the profession for which I was trained. For I had no 
desire to plead cases or to haunt the Royal Stoa and impress the petitioners 
with my eloquence. I therefore neglected my career for the disgraceful life of 
an idle layabout. My interests were the gang fights of the ‘colours’, the 
chariot races and the pantomimes, and I even entered the wrestling ring. I 
sailed with such folly that I not only lost my shirt but also my good sense and 
all my decency.
Menander continued in this way until the accession of Maurice, who ‘offered 
financial inducements to stimulate slothful intellects’.41
Unlike other earlier writers, Ammianus for example, there are a multitude of 
Persians identified by name in Menander’s history, and all of them are recognisable 
as individuals rather than as faceless traditional barbarians. He did on two occasions 
fall into the trap of mistaking a Persian family name for a title – first with 
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Yesdegusnaph who ‘held the rank of Zikh, which is the highest honour amongst the 
Persians’42 and with the Surenas43 - but this is a minor qualm. As Blockley put it:44
Amongst the Persians there is Yezdegusnaph the Zikh, intelligent, laconic 
and the master of Peter over Suania; the experienced diplomat Andigan; the 
effective soldier Tankhosdro; and above all Zacharias’ opponent Mebod, 
diplomat, soldier, statesman, arrogant, cunning and bitterly hostile to the 
Romans.
In particular, Menander left us a full account of the negotiations over the peace of 
561 and much of the other events of the period despite the fragmentary nature of the 
evidence. He is a very important source for the period. However, while there are 
some conclusions to be drawn from his work, he does not present a large quantity of 
material on Persian internal politics. This is a common flaw with western writers, 
and Menander remains one of the better of these.
Finally, the following is one example of events from the fifth and sixth centuries that 
are important for this thesis. It is placed here to allow the reader to see how the 
above information will be used in practice. 
Compared to the better-known Manichaean heresy, the Mazdakite sect that arose in 
Persia during the first reign of Kavad has left little mark on history. First mentioned 
at the end of the first reign of Kavad in 496 with his association with them and 
adaptation of their doctrines listed as the major cause for his downfall in the Arab 
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sources, they disappear from the extant records until the end of his reign and the 
beginning of that of his son, Khusrau I, when they are listed as being massacred by 
the new . The entire incident continues to divide scholars, but it is still 
possible to deduce a significant amount about the relations between the king of kings 
and his nobility and priests from the incident as portrayed in al-Tabari and Procopius 
amongst other writers.
To begin with, both writers imply that there were no attempts from within Persia to 
reinstate Kavad,45 even upon his escape from the Prison of Oblivion, and neither 
account of the facts details anything other than his escape and his return from exile 
with the backing of the Hephthalites which occurred in either 498 or 499 according 
to the sources.46 Regardless, Kavad then went on to act in a manner that the sources 
consider much more befitting of a Persian ruler.47 While it is dangerous to draw 
conjecture from the absence of evidence, it is worth noting this lack. The story as 
written in both Procopius and al-Tabari is centred on the exploits of Kavad himself, 
which probably explains the lack of focus on events in Persia, but it is still an 
interesting omission. The implication to be drawn is that the alliance of Kavad with 
the Mazdakites was unpopular enough to turn a majority of the nobility and the 
priesthood against him.48
There is one major difference in the story as presented by Procopius and as presented 
by al-Tabari. This difference lies in the level of detail in which they record the events 
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of the fall of Kavad and his return. Procopius simply noted that Kavad was 
overthrown by the common people, unlikely in itself if we are to believe the contents
of the Mazdakite manifesto, because of the laws that he was supposed to have made 
regarding property and women.49 Al-Tabari, however, instead definitely attributes 
the fall to the machinations of the nobility and the priesthood, and caused by 
Kavad’s association with the heresiarch Mazdak.50 The difference will be addressed 
later, but suffice it to say that there is a limit to our knowledge about the Mazdakites 
even beyond the normal limitations for Sassanid Persia.
In conclusion, the amount of source material varies greatly in both quantity and 
quality throughout the Sassanid period, although the bulk of it is in the latter half of 
the empire’s history. This often precludes a detailed study of the internal aspects of 
the empire, but by focussing on the later period, it is possible to report on these with 
some expectation of remaining true to the original material while still remaining 
critical of it. This is particularly important when considering that there is often a gap 
between the more local but often much later Muslim sources and the contemporary 
but generally distant Byzantine and Roman sources. This gap is partly filled by the 
Syriac and Armenian writers, but these are not always available. Even where they 
are, they are also not as readily available as those sources written in Latin or Greek. 
Essentially, a historian of the Sassanid era must be ready to use a combination of 
sources, which is what I hope to do in the following thesis.
                                                  
49 Procopius  I.5.1-3.
50 Al-Tabari 885 and 886.
Wars
27
C H A P T E R    O N E
In the early years of the Sassanid dynasty, evidence of the way that rulers and their 
chief subjects interacted is limited in the extreme, even given the lessened standards 
that have to be applied compared to other eras of antiquity. It was moments of 
especial turmoil within the empire that impacted on the external writers, and 
deprived as historians are of the writers who made the last two centuries of Sassanid 
rule infinitely more accessible, the only option is to speculate based on the little 
evidence that we have. It is the intention of this chapter to focus on two principal 
subjects beginning with the third and fourth centuries until the end of the reign of 
Shapur II, with particular emphasis on the high priest Kartir and the information to 
be gleaned from Ammianus Marcellinus. The second is two specific incidents – that 
of the Mazdakite heresy and its involvement with the overthrow of Kavad and also 
the extermination of the sect by his son Khusrau I.
As noted in the introduction, the most obvious example of how the Persian elite 
interacted with their rulers can be found in the person of Kartir, who served in 
important roles under at least four monarchs towards the end of the third century. For 
once, a single individual who is not  has enough evidence regarding him 
in the sources to reconstruct the bulk of his career. This is primarily because of an 
inscription, written by order of Kartir himself during the reign of Bahram II, and 
relating his career to date under Shapur I, Hormizd I, Bahram I and Bahram II. The 
inscriptions, the most famous at Naqsh-i Rustam but with others at Naqsh-i Rajab 
and elsewhere, are indication enough that Kartir was an important man, for no other 
­
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inscriptions by any other than the  themselves survive. That the 
inscriptions and a handful of Manichaean texts is all the information relating to 
Kartir is probably the reason why he does not feature in either the  or al-
Tabari. Assuming that their direct sources did not mention him and that there were 
no extant folk tales about him, then the only potential sources would have been the 
inscriptions, and his absence makes it appear likely that neither al-Tabari nor 
Ferdowsi read those. It is also important to remember that, while Kartir is unique in 
leaving us a record of his own career, it is quite likely that al-Tabari would have had 
access to other such records or tales about important Persian officials that we now 
lack. Therefore, he may have considered Kartir not to be significant enough to 
mention. Again, Kartir is noteworthy for us because we know so much about him 
compared to others. However, almost everything we know about Kartir was written 
by him and thus is likely to be at least partly exaggeration. In fact, as it appears to be 
his legacy in a way, declaring to all who came in later years that he had been the 
most trusted and powerful servant of the , it would be odd if there were 
no exaggerations. 
However, there is another indication of just how much power Kartir wielded in later 
years. Kartir appears again at Naqsh-i Rustam, this time in one of the rock reliefs 
that were carved beneath the tombs of the Achaemenid kings. One depicts the 
triumph of Shapur I over the emperors Valerian, Gordian and Philip the Arab, 
Gordian lying dead beneath Shapur’s horse and Philip kneeling before him while 
Valerian stands by Shapur, hand held by the . A man in Persian dress is 
portrayed behind Shapur, most of the image damaged, but the face is still clear. 
Given the prominence of Kartir in later years, and even during the reign of Shapur 
Shahanshahs
Shahnameh
Shahanshah
Shahanshah
29
himself, he is the most likely candidate. A similar carving can be seen at Bishapur, 
although that one is more intact.
After the reign of Bahram III, the widely held view is that Narses either had Kartir 
executed or that he was stripped of most of his power.51 This is due to the ceasing of 
the persecution of Christians and other minorities during Narses’ reign and the lack 
of any inscriptions or evidence for Kartir remaining in high office.52 However, this 
does not tell the entire story. To begin with, Boyce noted that a monument built by 
Narses in the pass of Paikuli included Kartir among those assembled, with the title of 
‘Ohrmazd mobad’.53 If this is not enough proof, then there is the fact that Narses did 
not choose to destroy or even damage Kartir’s inscriptions or the rock reliefs in 
which he appears – those of Bahram II as well as those of Shapur named earlier.54
Finally, there are two other possibilities. One is that Kartir died, whether of old age 
or other natural causes shortly after Narses came to power, so that his last act was to 
be present at whatever occasion prompted the list at Paikuli. Alternatively, 
throughout Kartir’s long career, he seems to have preferred to associate with 
successful kings and successful actions. Following the calamitous defeat that Narses 
suffered in 297, it is entirely understandable that he had no desire to add his 
association with this failure of a king to his great inscription. However, there is no 
evidence either way.
It is interesting that a Persian noble, let alone one of the priesthood, should be this 
powerful within the state. With the exception of Tansar and Kartir himself, there are 
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few named priests in the four centuries of Sassanid history, and none have left as 
great a mark on the record as Kartir. On the other hand, as noted above, all we have 
for this perceived authority is Kartir’s own word. No doubt he was powerful, but was 
he as powerful as some historians have presented him?
There is little evidence for the interactions between the king and his nobles during 
the reign of Shapur II, due to the lack of information in Ammianus regarding internal 
affairs in Persia. However, some information can be extrapolated from those Persian 
grandees who appear in command of armies or attending Shapur II in various 
capacities as well as from the other sources. For example, according to Theophanes 
and Festus, Narses, son of Shapur, commanded an army that overran Mesopotamia 
and captured Amida before dying at the battle of Narasara.55 However, the most 
prominent figure in the Persian hierarchy besides the king is the Surena, who appears 
in Ammianus as the commander of the western forces opposing Julian’s invasion 
until the king returns from the east.56 He then is appointed as the ambassador to 
Jovian and negotiates with him on two occasions.57 Once these negotiations fail, 
Shapur ordered him to recover the disputed territories by force.58 His predecessor in 
the 350s was Tamsapor, who apparently had authority to make peace subject only to 
the decision of the king.59 Clearly there was a considerable amount of independence 
granted to officials such as these, although their precise place in the command 
structure remains uncertain. Although the later period could suggest that a suitable 
title might have been , none of the Persian commanders, save for an 
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unnamed  who accompanied Shapur during the 362 campaign, is given a 
rank beyond general although, here again, the title is mistaken for a name.60
Ammianus commented that the Surena was the second most powerful man in Persia; 
however the Surena is more commonly identified as a family name, a member of the 
Suren family that was one of the so-called Seven Parthian Clans.61 So this is a 
debatable point, although it is a possibility that the two are not mutually 
contradictory. The other confirmed high ranking noble was Merena, named as the 
Master of the Horse, who led an army into battle.62 Following the end of the 
campaign, some satraps and other grandees are named in connection with the peace 
negotiations, but most only make a single appearance.63 In short, there is almost 
nothing to say about the interactions of the king and the nobility in this period. The 
nobles still commanded armies in the absence of the king and the lists of how many 
grandees died at this or that battle indicates that they still formed an important part of 
the Persian war effort. The Parthian Clans retained their high position at least in part, 
although they are presented as being subordinate to the . One interesting 
little mention in the  is that Shapur II was accompanied to war by 
the Chief , a man named Adarfarr, ‘on whose advice much blood of the 
martyrs of God was spilt in the Orient’.64
As noted elsewhere in this thesis, we have little information on the workings of the 
Zoroastrian religion within Persia, due to the lack of sources interested or informed 
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about it. Thus, debating about how particular members interacted with the king or 
their fellow nobles is difficult at the least and virtually impossible at the worst. 
Therefore, the information that the chief priest was with the king when he was 
campaigning against the Romans is valuable.65 Furthermore, that the king gave the 
 authority over three hundred soldiers and sent him to deal with the Christians 
in one area is a revelation in terms of the influence the  wielded, 66 even after 
the supposed reduction of their power by Narses at the end of the third century.67
However, it should be noted that Shapur II seems to have been a more pious man 
than Narses and it is equally possible that he returned powers to the  that his 
father had taken away. This may have been because of the success of the priesthood 
in predicting that his mother would give birth to a son who could inherit the throne, 
as noted in Agathias.68 Due to the lack of textual evidence for internal Sassanid laws, 
this is difficult to be certain about and once again all that we are left with is 
speculation. It is clear that Narses did not persecute religious minorities with the 
same vigour that Kartir claims that he did, although as noted above, whether the 
persecutions under Kartir were that vigorous remains unclear. He certainly claims 
that he did, but aside from the Manichaeans, for whom there is external evidence, it 
is impossible to be certain that his inscription is truthful.69 Even if it is, there is a 
great difference between a persecution of those who are publicly heretics, or 
members of another religion, and the systematic hunting down and extermination of 
entire groups. 
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This leads neatly into a point that I have touched upon earlier, namely the way in 
which historians, lacking virtually any other point of reference, have used the 
material provided to us by Kartir’s inscriptions and how they have presented his role
in the Sassanid court in the late third century. As such, it would be useful to examine 
the message he ordered to be carved on the Ka’ba-ye Zardosht at Naqsh-i Rustam in 
detail, or at least that part relating to his persecutions and his establishment of the 
Zoroastrian faith:70
And the false doctrines of the Ahreman and of the dews disappeared from the 
empire and were expelled. And the Jews, Buddhists, Brahmans, Nazarenes, 
Christians, Baptists and Manichaeans were broken up, and their idols were 
destroyed and the dwellings of the dews were annihilated and turned in 
places and seats of the gods.
Here we can see that Kartir named virtually every heresy or minor religion to be 
found within the Sassanid realm as having been ‘assailed’. Now, at the point at 
which he had this written, he had been in the service of the Sassanid dynasty for 
some fifty years as Kreyenbroeck noted.71 Thus his actions were spread across a 
number of years, even if we choose to assume that the quote above only refers to his 
actions while . In addition, given the lack of evidence, there is a 
question of whether the persecution was as widespread as Kartir might wish us to 
believe, as commented on above.
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A good place to start analysing Kartir’s place in the realm is Zaehner’s book on 
Zoroastrianism. It shows one of the traps that historians can easily fall into when 
speculating on the role of a significant individual. Zaehner believed that 
Zoroastrianism was intended to be the state religion of the Sassanid kingdom, as 
Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire. With this in mind, he 
casts Kartir as a reformer and an inquisitor. The following passage makes his view 
quite clear:72
Under [Kartir] Zoroastrianism appears for the first time as a fanatical and 
persecuting religion. The list of the sects persecuted, however, shows how 
justified the early Sassanian kings were in seeking a unifying force that 
would weld their Empire together, for not only do we find Jews, Christians, 
Manichees, and Mandaeans mentioned, but also Buddhists and Brahmans; all 
these Karter claims to have chastised. Zoroastrianism was actively enforced 
under the Magian hierarchy, the last vestiges of -worship were 
uprooted and the worshippers of the  were brought back to the true 
religion. Every effort was made too to extirpate all non-Zoroastrian religions, 
including the ‘Zandiks’ who were probably Zurvanite materialists, and, what 
is more, strict uniformity was to be the rule within the Zoroastrian church 
itself. ‘Heretics and apostates (?),’ Karter tells us, ‘who were within the 
Magian community, were spared for the religion of the worshippers of 
Mazdah and the rites of the gods but not for the spread of propaganda: I 
chastised them and upbraided them and improved them.’ Uniformity of belief 
was, then, certainly enforced, and the probability is that this unity was along 
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strictly dualist and Mazdean lines. Karter’s policy must then be seen as a 
reaction, under a series of weak kings, against the personal religious policy of 
Shapur.
This is not a feasible portrait of any religion in ancient times. To begin with, there is 
no evidence that there was a Zoroastrian ‘church’ as such. There was certainly a 
hierarchy, with Kartir at its head, with lesser priests.73 However, even if we accept 
Kartir’s text at face value, which is dangerous, the evidence is against all other faiths 
being purged from Persian territory during this period. Clearly, other sects survived 
Kartir’s time, for we find well-documented groups of Jews and Christians within 
Sassanid borders in later years.74 Yazdgird I was supposed to have nearly become a 
Christian under the influence of the Bishop Marutha75 while he also married a Jew –
Soshandukht, daughter of the Jewish .76 Equally, given that Narses is 
supposed by scholars to have stopped the persecutions, it is clear that they failed to 
wipe Iran clean of heresy and other religions. And I question the notion that even 
Kartir intended to set up a centralised church such as Zaehner, and others, imply. 
Under Bahram I the priest Kartir, or Kerdir, continued his career of 
consolidating the state church, and incidentally of self aggrandizement. He 
was probably the main influence in the imprisonment and death of Mani 
which took place under Bahram I.
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The religious history of the reigns of Hormizd and the two Bahrams is 
dominated by the figure of Kartir, who may have been the real power behind 
the throne of Bahram II. One might speculate that the priest used his 
influence in securing the succession to the throne for Bahram II, rather than 
for Narseh. The latter seems to have followed a liberal policy towards 
religious minorities in the empire, much like his father, Shapur, whereas the 
Bahrams were more amenable to the wishes of the conservative Zoroastrian 
priesthood. Apart from his religious impact, Kartir’s influence on political 
affairs should not be underestimated.
The above comes from Frye’s summary of Sassanid history in the 
.77 Here we can clearly see that Frye stated that Kartir was a priest in 
the mould of the Catholic church as portrayed by its opponents at the time of the 
Reformation – more interested in his own gains, be they measured in wealth or in 
power, than in the message of the faith. However, this conclusion neatly fits into 
Frye’s final comments on the Zoroastrian church – that it had become ‘stultified with 
too much concern for rites and rituals’.78 Thus, he sought to link the fall of the 
Empire back to the origins of the faith, and this conclusion necessitated that there be 
a single church of Persia and that its prelates were more concerned with power and 
ritual than faith. This is not necessarily supported by the texts Kartir left us. To begin 
with, they focus on his achievements as a priest – his establishment of fires, his 
establishment of the religion and its priests and the titles he held as a priest. Nowhere 
does it mention anything that he himself gained in material wealth from this 
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whatever Frye might think.79 Now, while it would be unusual for a priest to do so, it 
is important that, while remaining critical, not to be overly cynical when dealing 
with this type of script. It is easy for an historian writing in the more secular modern 
age to assume that a message of this ilk is pure propaganda – that Kartir was more 
politician than priest. On the other hand, it is equally likely, if not more probable, 
that Kartir honestly believed in what he preached. He was, after all, the 
‘Ahuramazda-mobad’ of the entire Empire, the ‘soul saviour of Bahram’, responsible 
for the establishment of fires throughout Persia.80 Is it so unlikely that he was a true 
believer, who did the work because he believed in the message he spread? 
This is not to deny that he wielded immense influence. As noted at the beginning, he 
appears in multiple rock reliefs and his own inscriptions would be enough to confirm 
his position as high in the favour of the kings he served. On the other hand, there is 
little in the inscription he wrote to imply that he had any direct influence, as Frye 
suggested, on the choice of Bahram II to succeed his father rather than his uncle 
Narses.81 It could certainly be argued that Kartir simply did not dare to write that on 
his inscription, fearing that the king would punish him for it. Even that would imply 
that his influence was not as great as is sometimes suggested. Otherwise there is no 
reason to assume that Kartir, traditionally portrayed as boastful, would not have 
included such a triumph of his career as chief priest – to be the kingmaker would 
have been a role that would have ensured his fame. And that is why I personally do 
not feel that Kartir played as large a role in that as some have suggested. There is no 
indication in any of the other sources that Kartir had a key role in Bahram II’s 
accession to the throne instead of Narses. Indeed, there is no indication that anyone 
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other than Bahram II was ever a contender at that point. Certainly, while he did not 
reign for long, there is no indication that a civil war broke out until after he was 
dead. Therefore, it is just as likely that Bahram II was able to ascend to the throne 
with the support of at least the silent majority of the nobility. This, combined with no 
indication that Kartir was known to the Romans or to the later sources, argues 
against him having been a truly major political player on that level despite, or 
perhaps because of, the lack of evidence.
Furthermore, this touches on another issue linked directly to Kartir, this being the 
power of the  at the end of the third century and whether they were 
being controlled by Kartir. It is true that Kartir was an immensely powerful figure by 
the time of Bahram II. He was high priest, had been elevated to the nobility, and was 
now known as the Saviour of Bahram’s Soul.82 As far as we know, he was the 
closest man on earth to Ohrmazd with one exception, that being the . 
The king was chosen by Ohrmazd, as can be seen in the coronation carvings. 
Effectively, Kartir was the chief priest, but he was outranked by the  and 
could have been replaced. To our knowledge, the titles Kartir held conferred no 
temporal power beyond any land he himself owned. Any influence he had over the 
king would have come from his status as an elder statesman - he would have had 
such status by this time. His power was limited to that which the king chose to grant 
him. Certainly, Kartir was influential under Bahram I and Bahram II, but assuming 
that he dominated the king, or that either Bahram was weak willed is reading far too 
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much into limited evidence. As a contrast, there is this passage from a Manichaean 
source:83
When the Magi observed (them), they asked: ‘Who indeed is this who has 
come (in?’; and they said) to them: ‘It is Manichaios.’ When they heard (this, 
they shook) and were filled with anger so they went and accused (him) to 
Kardel. Kardel himself told (the accusations) to the ( .) Then 
Kardel and the  went (and repeated) the accusations to the 
. The  himself told (the accusations) to the king. When he 
had heard these things… he then sent for my lord, summoning him.
From this, the opposite is implied. Kartir does not even have direct access to the 
king. He had to secure the assistance of two other officials, officials that are implied 
to be of higher rank than he was. Certainly, in this recounting, Kartir’s influence 
beyond the Magi would appear to be minimal. There is another account, also from a 
Manichaean tradition:84
And [the king] stood up from his meal; and, putting one arm round the queen 
of the Sakas and the other around Karder, the son of Ardavan, he came to the 
Lord. And his first words to the Lord were: ‘You are not welcome.’ And the 
Lord replied: ‘Why? What wrong have I done?’ The king said: ‘I have sworn 
an oath not to let you come into this land!’ And in anger he spoke thus to the 
Lord: ‘Ah, what need of you, since you go neither fighting nor hunting? But 
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perhaps you are needed for this doctoring and this physicking? And you 
don’t even do that!’
This passage is important for two reasons. First, it shows that Kartir was indeed high 
in the king’s favour, for the implication is that those with whom he chose to dine and 
to embrace were those closest to him. However, it also indicates that the key reason 
for the death of Mani, one of the crucial parts of Kartir’s reputation as a persecutor 
of other faiths, had nothing to do with the message that he was preaching as such, 
but more that he would persuade other Persian nobles to join him in ‘neither hunting 
nor fighting’.85 Evidently, this would have been a major problem for the Sassanid 
army, quite apart from the social ramifications. 
Kartir was and remains an enigmatic figure for all that he is one of the people of the 
Sassanid era that we know more about. However, due to the ease of placing a 
particular spin on his words and his actions, the ‘real’ Kartir, if such a personage 
ever existed, has effectively been hidden behind the multiple veils that historians 
have drawn around him. To be fair, it is probably unrealistic to expect a fair 
judgement of a man such as Kartir when the only evidence we have is so polarised 
and limited, but to classify him as the prime mover in the politics of the time would 
seem to both overplay his importance and reduce the  to a mere rubber 
stamp, an interpretation that is not supported in the sources, nor even mentioned. As 
the Roman Empire shows, if there is even the chance that a ruler is being 
manipulated by over mighty servants, it will almost always make its way into the 
historical tradition – as the examples of Claudius, supposedly dominated by his 
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wives and his freedmen such as Narcissus, or Nero by his mother, show.86 That there 
is no indication of this is as good an argument against it as is the supposition for it. 
As to the relations between the king and his priests and nobles, this period has often 
been taken to demonstrate the weakness of the monarchy at the end of the third 
century and its comparative strength under Ardashir I, Shapur I and Shapur II. It has 
been suggested that, in the case of the first two, they had the advantage of being 
already proven as leaders before they became the king of the Persian Empire, 
whereas others did not. With Shapur II, the length of his reign indicates his success 
in establishing his authority over his subjects, as do the defeats that he managed to 
inflict upon the Roman Empire such as his defeat of Julian’s campaign and the 
extremely one sided peace treaty to which he forced Jovian to agree. When this is 
compared with Hormizd I, Bahram I, Bahram II and Narses in particular, it is easy to 
see why they have been seen as weak. However, while Narses was destined to fail, 
the same cannot be said of the two Bahrams, both of whom seem to have died, so far 
as we can tell, from natural causes. The assumption that either of them was not 
master of his own fate seems odd given the lack of evidence for this scenario and 
contrary to the perception of Sassanid kings. I agree that Kartir was a powerful 
figure who had the ear of the king and was presumably the foremost authority on 
religious matters. However, there is a vast gulf between that and the suggestions 
made by Zaehner87 and Frye,88 which is unbridgeable save by speculation 
unsupported by the sources. Similarly, the traditional view that he was sidelined by 
Narses has no basis in anything more than supposition by Ghirshman and others.89 It 
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is equally valid to argue the opposite, that he was equally important in the court of 
Narses and that he simply did not see the need to update his inscriptions or that he 
did not wish to be associated with the new king. 
In conclusion, there is very little to be said with certainty about the king and the 
nobility of this period, even when compared to the later period. This is primarily due 
to the lack of sources and the nature of those we do have. There is a need to 
speculate and consider what little we have, but it is important to avoid assuming that 
this speculation is the truth, as has happened with Kartir.
Again, after this, there is a gap in our ability to narrate or even analyse the relations 
between the kings and their nobles. Al-Tabari provided a number of stories and 
examples that could be said to fill the void, but these are often lone incidents. For 
example, the successor to Shapur II, Ardashir II is said to have received ‘the great 
men of state’90 enthusiastically but then, ‘when he was securely on the throne, he 
turned his attention to the great men and the holders of authority, and killed a great 
number of them’.91 His successor (after he was deposed) was Shapur III, who was 
murdered by the ‘great men of state and the members of the noble houses’92 and, 
following the death of Yazdgird I, the nobility chose to ignore his children, allegedly 
on account of his ‘evil conduct’.93 Aside from Mihr-Narseh, who was vizier to 
Yazdgird I, his son Bahram V and Yazdgird II, there are few individuals who stand 
out, and those who do are not usually mentioned many times.94 Aside from    
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Bahram V and Peroz, the reigns of the kings between Shapur II and Kavad were 
short in record if not in actual years. One interesting fact that emerges from al-
Tabari’s account is that the Chief  was the one responsible for crowning the 
.95 However, it is the reign of Kavad that provides us with the next 
rewarding case study.
Compared to the better-known Manichaeans, the Mazdakite sect that arose in Persia 
during the first reign of Kavad has left little mark on history.96 First mentioned in 
most sources97 at the end of the first reign of Kavad in 496 with his association with 
them and adaptation of their doctrines listed as the major cause for his downfall in 
the Arab sources,98 they disappear from the extant records until the end of his reign 
and the beginning of that of his son, Khusrau I, when they are listed as being 
massacred by the new .99 The entire incident continues to divide 
scholars, but it is still possible to deduce a significant amount about the relations 
between the king of kings and his nobility and priests from the incident as portrayed 
in al-Tabari and Procopius amongst other writers.100
The most important sources for this event, although not the only ones, are Procopius 
and al-Tabari, which represent two slightly different although similar versions of the 
same story. To begin with, both writers imply that there were no attempts from 
within Persia to reinstate Kavad, even upon his escape from the Prison of Oblivion, 
and neither account of the facts details anything other than his escape and his return 
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from exile with the backing of the Hephthalites which occurred in either AD 498 or 
499 according to the sources.101 Regardless, Kavad then went on to act in a manner 
that the sources consider much more befitting of a Persian ruler – ‘And the kingdom 
was strengthened by Cabades and guarded securely; for in shrewdness and activity 
he was surpassed by none’.102 While it is dangerous to draw conjecture from the 
absence of evidence, it is worth noting this lack. The story as written in both 
Procopius and al-Tabari is centred on the exploits of Kavad himself, which probably 
explains the lack of focus on events in Persia, but it is still an interesting omission. 
The implication to be drawn is that the alliance of Kavad with the Mazdakites was 
unpopular enough to turn a majority of the nobility and the priesthood against him, a 
point to be revisited later.
There is one major difference between the stories presented by Procopius and al-
Tabari. This difference lies in the level of detail in which they record the events of 
the fall of Kavad and his return. Procopius simply noted that Kavad was overthrown 
by the common people, unlikely in itself if we are to believe the contents of the 
Mazdakite manifesto, because of the laws that he made regarding property and 
women.103 Al-Tabari, however, instead definitely attributes the fall to the 
machinations of the nobility and the priesthood, and caused by Kavad’s association 
with the heresiarch Mazdak.104 The difference will be addressed later, but suffice it 
to say that there is a limit to our knowledge about the Mazdakites even beyond the 
normal limitations for Sassanid Persia and that a large portion of the work below will 
be supposition.
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Regardless, it is clear that, for whatever reason, the  Kavad supported the 
Mazdakite sect towards the end of his first reign. For this, he was removed from the 
throne by an alliance of the nobility and the priesthood and imprisoned. His escape 
and return are a matter of record, although interestingly one that is excluded from the 
account presented in the . Here, Kavad is never deposed, although 
Mazdak is present as his chief minister and confidant. Instead, Khusrau debated with 
Mazdak, and convinced his father to give Mazdak and his following to him to deal 
with. Khusrau then executed the followers by burying them upside down in the sand 
and Mazdak by a combination of hanging and arrows.105 This account would seem to 
be a synthesis of the others, giving the predominant role to Khusrau instead of the 
nobility, removing Kavad’s fall and presenting a single fall of the Mazdakites at a 
time presumably late in Kavad’s reign when Khusrau is old enough to advise his 
father. Given that he died in 579, it is difficult to reconcile this with the 
account since it states that Khusrau was 74 when he died.106 This would make the 
Mazdakite incident much later than in the other sources, and thus the , 
while a useful source on later opinion of the Mazdakites, should be discarded as an 
historical source. It does, however, support the existence of Mazdak as a person, 
something that is not always taken for granted, as commented on below.
One angle sometimes explored by modern historians, such as Patricia Crone 
(although she rejects it) is the suggestion that Mazdak himself never existed in the 
form presented in al-Tabari or the other Muslim authors and that the story presented 
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to us by Procopius and his contemporaries is closer to the truth.107 Crone notes the 
oddities in the different versions based on the time and place at which they were 
written.108 The two issues are separate but linked. Mazdak is only named in the later 
Islamic sources109 while, in the Greek tradition, Kavad himself is named as the 
author of the doctrine that he sought to impose on his subjects.110 A further twist is 
added by the disappearance of Mazdak at the end of the first reign of Kavad in 496 
only to reappear in the 530s, nearly half a century later, to be massacred by 
Khusrau.111
Again, it is entirely possible to draw a picture of Sassanid power structures here, 
using the facts that we have to hand. First, it is clear from a variety of accounts that 
all power in the Sassanid state flowed from the King of Kings and his court, 
comprised of the major nobility and the Zoroastrian priests. Any group that hoped to 
be successful would have to have had influence here. Secondly, even without this, 
there are few cases in ancient or medieval history of major grassroots movements 
although there may have been exceptions such as the ,112 because education 
and knowledge were concentrated in the upper classes of society, a trend that the 
Sassanid Empire does not seem to have broken. Thus, we can reasonably hypothesise 
that the leaders of the Mazdakite sect were nobles even if the bulk of the followers 
were the poor and those who felt deprived in other ways.113 Kavad promoted these 
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nobles within the court, granting them his favour, and began, so the sources say, to 
impose their doctrines on the rest of the nobility who lashed out.114
Once Kavad had fallen, it is hard to imagine that any of the Mazdakite nobles would 
have been allowed to survive long unless they recanted. Given that the nobility and 
the priesthood were willing to overthrow their king, the Chosen of Ohrmazd, it 
would be unlikely that they would be unwilling to kill a few of their own, leaving the 
sect without its leadership. However, even today, areas of Iran are all but 
disconnected from the rest of the country, so pockets almost certainly survived in 
backwater areas. Any further minor uprisings were presumably suppressed by the 
nobility or by Kavad, but the bulk of the followers simply carried on, safe in towns 
filled with their fellow religionists. Now, skipping ahead to the time of Khusrau’s 
accession, the Sassanid realm had just ended a major war against the Byzantines. 
The king was new to the throne, and seemingly inexperienced, although the sources 
indicate that he was already known to be opposed to the Mazdakites.115 There would 
seem to be no better moment for the Mazdakites to reassert themselves, given that 
they may have expected a groundswell of support from the soldiers or even nobles 
dissatisfied with their portion of the treasure from the settlement with Byzantium, 
and the nobles who had recanted earlier may have resurfaced. This, of course, gave 
Khusrau the perfect excuse to make examples out of them.
This still leaves the issue of how the heresiarch Mazdak survived to lead the second 
uprising. Of course, there is no way to prove whether it was the same man. The 
original may have died in the aftermath of Kavad’s overthrow or in the interim, but it 
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is entirely possible that someone else took up the name as a rallying point. 
Furthermore, the notion that Mazdak died in the latter event may have slipped into 
the tradition at a later date to tie up the loose end that he represented in the tale. 
Another possibility is that Khusrau himself engineered the whole series of events. At 
this point, he seems to have been new to the throne, and while he was the chosen 
successor of Kavad, he had at least two brothers that may have either wished to seize 
the throne for themselves or have been manipulated by others on their behalf. One, 
called Zamez in Procopius, had been disqualified from the succession by virtue of 
being scarred, but that may not have been enough to stop Khusrau seeking to 
reinforce his power.116 The easiest method of that may have been to assemble the 
nobles against a common enemy. The normal options were the Byzantines or the 
Christians, but fighting the Byzantines would mean a major war similar to the one 
that had just concluded in addition to breaking the Endless Peace with the attendant 
loss of valuable tribute, and persecuting the Christians was generally a means toward 
provoking the Byzantines rather than an end in itself by this time. However, given 
that almost all of the nobility seem to have been opposed to the Mazdakites, the sect 
was a much easier target with no concerns about external intervention on their 
behalf.117
As mentioned above, there is a theory that says that Mazdak was a later invention, 
potentially added in by Khusrau in an attempt to restore his father’s reputation 
somewhat, suggested by historians such as Gaube,118 or indeed the reverse suggested 
by Klima – that Mazdak had been deleted from the earlier records by Khusrau in a 
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similar attempt.119 Neither suggestion is particularly convincing for a number of 
reasons. The strongest one is that both theories assume that Khusrau had the power 
and the ability to orchestrate such a cover up. Above, I noted that, at the time of his 
accession, Khusrau’s rule was not secure. He was a young king, one without the 
respect of the nobility, which he earned primarily by fighting a number of wars 
against the Byzantines and by his reorganisation of the state to give him greater 
power in the military arena. At this point, he could not have exerted that later 
influence to stop tales spreading among the nobility about his actions. Moreover, 
nearly half a century had passed since the first reign of Kavad, and the tale had 
assuredly spread since then, probably into Byzantine territory through diplomats and 
exiles. This by itself makes Klima’s theory unlikely in the extreme, as there is almost 
no way that Khusrau would have been able to control the information reaching those 
writing history, keeping in mind that the writings that have survived are not the only 
ones that would have been written.120 This leaves us with Gaube’s theory, that 
Mazdak was written into the sources on Khusrau’s orders to preserve his father’s 
damaged reputation for future generations.121 Again, the major stumbling block here 
is the ability of the , even one as powerful as Khusrau Anurshirvan, to 
control the opinions of his people. Without the bureaucracy of modern states or some 
sort of state controlled media, he would have had to literally order the histories to be 
rewritten to include Mazdak, a difficult task even today, and nigh impossible then 
given the geographical limitations of travel, the prevalence of aural culture and the 
number of Persians that travelled abroad either temporarily or permanently, some 
into exile such as Hormizd, brother of Shapur II.122 Certainly, at the beginning of his 
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reign, it would have been beyond Khusrau’s ability. It is possible that he might have 
been able to achieve it later, at the peak of his power, but that begs another question. 
Why would he have bothered?
By the time we come to the peak of his power, Khusrau is a powerful ruler in his 
own right. He had waged and won major wars against the traditional enemy of the 
Persians, as well as against internal heretics and had a firmer grasp on power than 
most of his predecessors. Why would he have wished to use that power to rewrite 
history? He himself was above all reproach in the matter, and no amount of rewriting 
would have changed that. There were mitigating factors to his father’s relationship 
with the Mazdakites and, finally, he had redeemed himself by ruling in the 
traditional mode of Persian kings once he returned to the throne.123 There was no 
need to exert himself to try and change what he could not change.
Even if we accept that Khusrau was able to rewrite history to such a degree as to fool 
all of the Arab historians writing centuries later, it would seem that he did not do a 
very good job. While manipulation from Mazdak would mitigate Kavad’s decisions, 
he would still appear foolish. Moreover, there is little in the portrayal of Mazdak to 
indicate that we are intended to view him as the cause – the focus in al-Tabari’s 
account remains on Kavad throughout with Mazdak presented as the fount of the 
doctrines only.124 If Khusrau had been trying to restore his father’s reputation, why 
did he not remove the entire incident entirely? It would have been simpler and more 
effective than inventing a heresiarch to add to the story.125
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This still does not explain the absence of Mazdak from the Byzantine sources, such 
as Procopius. Here, there are three immediately obvious theories. One, and the least 
satisfactory in many ways, is that Procopius’ source was inaccurate and thus he 
heard a garbled version of events that skipped over Mazdak’s role. The second, 
similar to the first, is that his source was deliberately inaccurate, perhaps a 
Mazdakite or other opponent of Kavad, and blamed the king for everything. Finally, 
and the most probable in many ways, is that Procopius and the others chose not to 
include Mazdak in their history. For example, Procopius was most interested in the 
story of the Prison of Oblivion, the escape of Kavad from it, and his return to power 
at the head of a Hephthalite army.126 Fitting an obscure Persian heresiarch into the 
story, whom many of his readers might never have heard of, would detract from the 
purity of the tale that he expounded and the moral behind it, an important moment to 
remember the moral value attached to the writing of history in Graeco-Roman 
culture. The way it is presented at the moment, it follows the archetype of the ruler 
who made mistakes when he was younger, paid for them, and then returned to rule 
wisely and well, and can be seen as a cautionary tale on the exuberance of youth 
when applied to politics as well as an interesting tale of Persian customs and a good 
adventure story. Quite simply, to add Mazdak into this would have needlessly 
complicated matters for the writer. The simplest solution is perhaps to assume a 
combination of the above factors.
Now, it is also important to consider why Kavad would have chosen to embrace such 
an ideology in the first place. After all, most accounts list either reallocation of 
women or property or both as virtues of the Mazdakite sect, which is why it was 
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considered such a danger by the nobility, for such redistribution would have 
threatened their status as well as threatening to undermine the concept of hereditary 
nobility in general, given that at least one source claimed that fathers would no 
longer know their own sons. If this were true, and there is almost certainly historical 
bias and propaganda to take into account, the Sassanid state as it existed at the time 
would have been shattered or changed irrevocably. However, those aspects of the 
sect would seem to threaten the power of the king as well, because he depended on 
the ability to present land or other property to nobles as a gift to retain or gain their 
allegiance and thus gain access to their soldiers. Without the nobility, Kavad would 
lose his own power. However, this need not be inexplicable. It is impossible to rule 
out sincere belief in at least some of the teachings of Mazdak and there are also other 
potential explanations as noted below.
Another possibility is that he intended to use the sect as a balancing act against the 
traditional nobility and priesthood, as Khusrau II later used Christians. Generally, the 
 can be seen to balance the two groups against the other, favouring one 
to ensure his own ascendance. This can be seen in, for example, the favour shown to 
Kartir, the , during the reigns of Bahram I and II or to the 
priesthood in the reign of Shapur II.127 Equally though, other kings preferred to rely 
on groups within the state that were entirely dependent on them for protection, such 
as Jews or other outsiders. Already mentioned is Khusrau II’s choice to use 
Christians,128 but Shapur I seems to have considered the newly born Manichaean 
sect, and records of the period find Mani himself at court at times.129 In short, to 
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retain their ascendance, the King of Kings would balance the various groups one 
against the other, and we might see Kavad’s actions in this tradition – seeking a third 
option. 
A third option links in more to Zoroastrian traditions. A hallmark of the Sassanid 
dynasty was a claim to be restoring the past Achaemenid Empire after the long 
interregnum of first the Greeks and then the Parthians, who were not true Persians. 
This included claims to be restoring the Zoroastrian faith and church to an older, 
purer version. Although it is difficult to tell from the extant sources, this may have 
been the case with Mazdak and his followers. If this were so, Kavad may have 
viewed this as a stance likely to be popular with the priests at the least, because he 
was following the traditional line. However, the rise of Mazdak would have been 
against the priests’ interests for two reasons. First, it almost certainly barred them 
from being particularly close to Kavad. And then there was the ideology that the 
Mazdakite sect stood for – allegedly a communistic approach to property and 
women. Given that the priests derived most of their own power and not-
inconsiderable influence from the system as it was, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
political backlash may have exceeded the expectations of Kavad. 
Further, there is another potential aspect to the Mazdakite problem. Kavad’s son and 
heir, Khusrau, has become known for the changes that he made to the Sassanid state, 
concentrating more power in his own hands by reducing the dependence of the 
 on the nobility to raise an army, although the evidence for this is 
slender.130 It could be, therefore, that Kavad had intended to use the Mazdakites in 
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an attempt to do much the same, either by directly using Mazdak and his followers to 
bypass the nobility or by creating a plausible internal enemy to draw attention from 
his own plans for the future of the state, and this is the scenario envisaged by 
Noldeke.131 It should be noted, as pointed out above, that Khusrau I is supposed to 
have only made his own attempt after consolidating his personal prestige, first by the 
slaughter of the Mazdakites and then by waging a successful war against Byzantium. 
Equally, Kavad had laid the groundwork for some of this in the later part of his 
reign, and with prestige and precedent he would have been able to force through the 
reforms against any resistance that the nobility offered. Further, the reforms are 
suggested to have offered rewards to the nobles, placing the burden of paying 
soldiers on the state as well as that of equipping them while simultaneously offering 
more nobles the opportunity to command armies with the attendant chances at 
pillaging enemy cities.132 No such opportunity would have been immediately 
obvious in the promotion of the Mazdakites by Kavad. 
Garsoian noted in her article on Byzantium and Sassanid Persia that the source of 
inspiration for Sassanid change was Byzantium, their greatest enemy and the most 
obvious model to choose given the time that had passed since the time of the 
Achaemenids, the dynasty that the Sassanids claimed as exemplars, and the 
difference between the situations faced by the two.133 The Byzantine rulers had 
absolute power within their own empire, with the nobility dependant on the emperor 
for their power. Contrast this to the Sassanid Empire, where the  was 
himself dependant on his nobles for power and the desire to adopt a system closer to 
that of the Byzantines, even if only in this one area, becomes clear. Now, as 
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indicated elsewhere, the nobles were hardly likely to simply abdicate their authority 
and give it to the king. One major strand of the authority of the Byzantine emperors 
was their position as the vice-regent of God on Earth and the support of the Christian 
Church, which had resulted primarily from the protection and influence of Emperors 
such as Constantine the Great and Theodosius. With this example in mind, Kavad 
may have considered that it would be to his advantage to find himself a similar 
position. The Zoroastrian church, as it stood, would not have served in quite the 
same way – after all, it had now been in existence for over two centuries and it had 
lost whatever revolutionary spirit it might have ever had. As noted, part of the reason 
that the priests supported the coup d’état was that they did not wish to lose their own 
privileges acquired from earlier monarchs. Instead, Kavad may have turned to the 
Mazdakites, a younger sect, descended from Zarathustra’s own teachings and thus 
still acceptably close to the state religion. However, as a younger sect and without 
the support held by the older religion, they would be dependent upon the protection 
of Kavad and thus more likely to support him unconditionally. This, in combination 
with the potential wealth to be obtained from the change over, might have allowed 
Kavad to push through the reforms that Khusrau eventually did, reforms that gave 
the centre of the state more power – exactly as in the Byzantine Empire. There is 
evidence moreover from al-Tabari and other sources that Kavad had in fact begun 
the administrative reforms that Khusrau was eventually supposed to have carried to 
fruition at the end of his reign.134 The reforms and the evidence for them will be 
discussed in detail in the next chapter.
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Equally, Kavad seems to have been relatively young when he came to the throne, as 
he ruled (excepting the interval of 496-9) until 531, which means that he was at least 
in his forties when he died, and probably older given that al-Tabari notes that he died 
of old age.135 While unlikely to have been as young as Shapur II, who was supposed 
to have been crowned before he was born and certainly needed a regent for some 
years,136 Kavad is also unlikely to have been in the position of Ardashir I or Shapur 
I, both of whom had had experience of government prior to becoming king and 
certainly had impressive records of campaigns against the Romans behind them. 
Instead, he may have been old enough to assert himself, but without the background 
to impress the nobility or the experience to know how far he could push his subjects 
before there was a backlash. 
Interestingly, the incident with Kavad seems to have been an exception, possibly the 
one that proves the rule, in that both the nobility and the priesthood cooperated in 
deposing a king. It is unusual enough in Sassanid history for a ruling  to 
be removed as opposed to being denied the throne or having it usurped, as happened 
to Khusrau II, but this is the only one where both the nobility and the priesthood are 
explicitly noted as cooperating against the . This itself shows the degree 
to which both groups felt threatened by the actions of Kavad and how far he had 
alienated the two groups on which his throne depended. A king needed the nobles to 
support his reign and to provide soldiers to make war. He needed the priests to 
provide the moral support and to prove that his reign was sanctioned by the god 
Ohrmazd. Equally, most kings seem to have favoured one group over the other to 
keep them in balance. This also meant that, if the interests of one group were 
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threatened, they could not revolt by themselves. Even if all of the disparate nobles of 
the vast Sassanid Empire somehow made common cause, without the support of the 
priests, it is unlikely that any of them could be regarded as a legitimate king. But 
without the nobles, the priests lacked the military might to actually remove the king. 
Hence the need for a balance between them.
At this point, it is almost impossible that the conspiracy, for that is what it was, to 
remove Kavad was a monolithic block comprised of all the nobles and priests -
whatever the view presented in the sources. There were, of course, the Mazdakite 
nobles already mentioned, and it is likely that the doctrine had its supporters 
amongst the priests as well. In fact, the description by al-Tabari almost suggests that 
the group that actively removed Kavad was a minority among the higher-ranking 
Persians.137 This, of course, does not mean that his removal was not tacitly supported
by the silent majority, for there was no attempt to return him to power or at least 
none that were recorded.138 However, even with the priests supporting the decision, 
it is unlikely that every noble was comfortable with the idea of removing Kavad. He 
was, after all, portrayed as the chosen of the Zoroastrian god and, as later history has 
shown, such titles can have a powerful effect on what a noble is prepared to accept. 
Moreover, our sources are unclear on the exact timeline of the association between 
Kavad and Mazdak as well as the extent of it.  Due to this uncertainty, we cannot say 
how much of the doctrine of the Mazdakites had been implemented in the law of the 
state, or how far Kavad intended to go with it. The revolt may have been, as 
Procopius implied, a direct result of a law written by Kavad to which the nobles 
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involved objected.139 Alternatively, they may have decided that the future of the state 
was not secure with Kavad at the helm and chosen to make a pre-emptive strike. It 
may have been a combination of the two – there is simply no way to be sure given 
the gaps and outright contradictions that litter the extant sources.
Before concluding, there is one last element to the reign of Kavad that deserves 
discussion – the Persian noble Seoses. It was he who engineered the escape of Kavad 
from Persia to the territory of the Hephthalites and remained with him there.140After 
his return from exile, Kavad made him , apparently the first 
and only holder of this office which placed him ‘in authority over all magistrates and 
over the whole army’.141 Theophylact stated that ‘Kabades measured out for Seoses 
the recompense for the bond of friendship and decorated him with the most pre-
eminent offices’.142 Unfortunately for Seoses, his good fortune did not last. He was 
sent by Kavad to negotiate the adoption of Khusrau by the Emperor Justinian and to 
‘arrange a settlement’.143 This mission was unsuccessful, and his fellow ambassador 
Mebodes, ‘who held the office of ’144, reported to Kavad that it had been 
Seoses who caused the failure of the negotiations. As a result, Seoses was placed on 
trial and condemned by the council. The most interesting part of the account is 
this:145
The judges therefore condemned the man to death, while Cabades, though 
seeming to be deeply moved with sympathy as a friend of Seoses, was by no 
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means willing to rescue him. He did not, on the other hand, make it known 
that he was angry with him, but, as he said, he was not willing to undo the 
laws of the Persians, although he owed the man the price of his life, since 
Seoses was chiefly responsible both for the fact that he was alive and also 
that he was king. Thus, then, Seoses was condemned and was removed from 
among men.
This demonstrates two points to historians. The first is that, however much power he 
may have had theoretically, Kavad was unwilling to risk overruling the will of the 
council even for the man who had been loyal to him through his exile and who is 
portrayed as the victim of palace intrigue. It is no surprise that this is evidence of 
how much the  depended on the balance being kept – at this time in his 
reign, Kavad had nowhere else to turn other than to his nobles. It would have been 
foolish to anger them over one man, and so Seoses was condemned. One must 
wonder how he regarded Kavad’s decision. On the other hand, this story also proved 
how far the nobles were dependent upon the king. Seoses rose to his position purely 
by the whim of Kavad, and he was given powers unprecedented in Persian history. 
As noted above, it was the envy of the other nobles for his power that condemned 
him.146
To conclude, there is much conjecture about the Mazdakite sect, its aims, doctrines, 
its place in Persian history, its fate and even its founder, let alone what it can tell us 
as historians about the relation between the king and his nobles at the end of the fifth 
century. However, as shown above, there are a number of different threads that can 
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be teased out from the narrative as we have it, even with the conflicting and outright 
contradictory nature of the evidence to hand. This is a common problem with 
Sassanid historiography in general as most of the sources are either written after the 
Muslim conquest of the area or by Romans and Byzantines whose view of the 
Persian state was distorted both by the enmity between the two major powers and by 
the difficulty in getting reliable and up-to-date news about the internal affairs of the 
Sassanid Empire. It is probable that Sassanid writers, should there have been any, 
would have shown a similar incomprehension about the Romans. It was simply a 
side effect of the difficulties presented by distance and the cultural divide.
In relation to the power structures of Sassanid Persia, this is an excellent example of 
what Khusrau’s later reforms are assumed to have been intended to prevent. After 
all, here we have a King of Kings removed from his throne by his own nobles and 
thrown into prison. He escapes only to need the assistance of an outside force to 
reclaim his throne. A similar incident marked the beginning of the reign of Khusrau 
II, who needed the assistance of the Byzantine Emperor Maurice to reclaim his 
power. Regardless, it is possible that it was this incident that indicated the need for 
major reforms quickly. If the nobles could overthrow a ruler because they did not 
like his policies, that would set the path open for anarchy and, as can be seen from 
events after the reign of Khusrau II, that left the empire open to external attack from 
all sides. Most importantly, it shows us as historians that the relationship between the 
king and his nobles was crucial in this period to the success of the state. While this is 
an extreme example of what could happen if the nobility were displeased, it is 
demonstrative of the fact that they had the means to display their displeasure with a 
given ruler in a manner that had an effect without tearing the state apart in civil war. 
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This decentralised nature of the state was both an advantage and a disadvantage to 
the kings as it allowed them to survive without a ruinously expensive bureaucracy to 
run an equally expensive army, but it forced them to rely on nobles who were, in the 
final analysis, unreliable although they also depended upon the king to adjudicate 
disputes and to allocate power between them. The subject of the next chapter will be 
to examine the reforms of Khusrau I, often touted as his final solution to the problem 
of the nobility. 
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C H A P T E R    T W O
Khusrau I, also known as  or ‘Of the Immortal Soul’, reigned as 
 of Sassanid Persia from 531 to 579. His reign was widely regarded by 
both the extant sources and many historians as the golden age of the Sassanid 
dynasty, when it reached its peak in almost every field – in particular the culture and 
the military. He led armies to victory against Byzantium. However, he is best 
remembered, ironically, for the part of his reign about which we know the least – a 
series of reforms that he supposedly made to almost every aspect of the Persian 
Empire at some point during his reign.147 There is little evidence for them, as I will 
demonstrate, and what little there is does not necessarily allow for a detailed picture. 
It is necessary to speculate and, because of this, scholars such as Ze’ev Rubin or 
Richard Frye have built the reforms into the defining aspect of his reign, based on 
evidence that is flimsy at best.
As such, this question is important because it cuts to the core of the sixth century 
history of Persia. Was Khusrau I a king who changed things and innovated or was he 
looking to the past? What were his intentions for any reforms he may have made? 
Was the impact of those reforms as great as has sometimes been presented? With the 
limited evidence that has survived, it is impossible for anyone to be certain what the 
exact intentions of Khusrau were, or the tangible impact or otherwise that they had 
on Persia. Conversely, it may be questioned whether the reforms were important or if 
they even happened in the way that the traditional view has presented. In this 
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presentation, I hope to examine the evidence for the reforms and the lack of it before 
dealing with that very question. 
The reforms of Khusrau I  are often presented as being one of the most 
important events in sixth century Persia despite the paucity of sources that record 
them, both at the time and from later periods. Indeed, the only source to record these 
events at length was al-Tabari, although other Muslim writers have commented on 
certain aspects. In more contemporary accounts, the only evidence comes from a 
seemingly offhand comment by Procopius that Khusrau was ‘strangely fond of 
innovations’148 and even this does not tell us much without any clarification of the 
innovations of which he was supposedly fond. Furthermore, while it is true that 
Procopius had some opportunity to learn of Persian internal affairs during his time as 
the secretary of Belisarius, the way he presented the remark is telling – he gave no 
evidence or reason for it, leaving it hanging, and thus apparently merely a rumour 
rather than something he viewed as particularly important. There is the possibility 
that he did not view the changes supposedly made as worthy of inclusion, but that is 
as damaging to a case made by Ghirshman or Frye as any suggestion that the reforms 
were not all that they have been made to be. In any event, Procopius did not see fit to 
expand upon his statement, and thus it can be dismissed with a note that Khusrau 
may have been known as an innovator even in his own time.
Thus, to analyse the reforms, to determine their content and their effect, if any, upon 
the Sassanid realm of the mid to late sixth century, it is necessary to turn to al-
Tabari, who alone of our sources preserves what may be a list of the reforms 
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undertaken during Khusrau’s reign. These, as can be seen from the evidence that has 
survived, encompassed many different aspects of government, from the legal to the 
military and from the fiscal to the religious. Some elements seem to be intended to 
reflect back upon the golden age of the first Sassanid rulers, others to be entirely new 
and arising from Khusrau’s own mind. All need to be examined individually, as well 
as together, as parts of what has often been seen as a cohesive whole in terms of both 
the source and the presentation by modern writers. The lack of adequate 
contemporary material, which is particularly acute here even for the ancient world, 
prevents any attempt to come to a definitive conclusion, and so it is left to the 
individual historian to determine how to view this period and what conclusions to 
reach about the reforms. 
As a final note, while there is no other direct evidence regarding the reforms, it is 
possible to use other sources to come to indirect conclusions about the reforms and 
the effectiveness thereof. In particular, this applies to the areas of the reforms 
concerning the military, where the Byzantine accounts of battles both before and 
after can be of great use. This is also true of the financial aspect, although not to the 
same degree. Contemporary evidence about the religion or legal system of the 
Sassanid Empire is extremely limited even from indirect sources. 
The aspect that is most often cited when discussing the reforms, as well as the one 
most often given as the driving force, is the changes made to the Persian army – the 
way it was raised, trained and equipped. 
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Before Kisra became king, the office of Isbahbadh – that is, the supreme 
commander of the armed forces – was held by one man, who was responsible 
for this supreme command over all the land. Kisra now divided this office 
and rank between four Isbahbadhs, namely, the Isbahbadh of the East, 
comprising Khurasan and its adjoining regions; the Isbahbadh of the West; 
the Isbahbadh of Nimruz, that is, the land of Yemen; and the Isbahbadh of 
Azerbaijan and its adjoining regions, that is, the Khazar lands. He saw in this 
new arrangement a way of improving the good ordering of his kingdom. He 
strengthened the fighting quality of the soldiers with weapons and mounts.149
He made enquiries about the cavalrymen of the army, and those lacking in 
resources he brought up to standard by allocating to them horses and 
equipment, and earmarked for them adequate financial allowances.150
These are the two key passages that have bearing upon the military reforms, although 
aspects of the tax changes also affected the army indirectly, through provision of 
food. Here, we can see the three primary changes that are attributed to him: the 
division of what had previously been a single supreme command into four separate 
areas, each under the authority of a , the increase in the quality of his 
soldiers, and the equipping of the cavalry ( ) as well as providing them 
with money. 
Often, the interpretation of this has been that Khusrau I instituted a standing army for 
the Sassanids. There are a number of problems with this interpretation, even 
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allowing for Rubin’s suggestion that such a system could not have outlived its 
creator.151 First of all, there is no noticeable decrease in the time that it takes the 
Sassanids to raise armies before and after the reforms. In particular, Evagrius noted 
in his account of the events of 573 that the Persians, despite having been forewarned 
of the Byzantine intentions, were not ready for the attack and that Khusrau was still 
assembling his own army when the Romans struck.152 Furthermore, there are no 
indications of a noticeable increase in the fighting abilities of the Sassanid army –
they win and lose battles in the campaigns of the early sixth century and in those of 
the later years.153 If there were substantial changes to the formations, the appearance, 
the tactics or the ability of the Persian forces in this period, we might well expect 
there to be comments on it in the Byzantine sources, given that there were plenty of 
opportunities for the writers of the period to note the changes as they occurred and to 
comment on them. This century also has a high proportion of extant sources, such as 
Procopius and the of Maurice, that we might reasonably expect to note 
changes. And yet, neither of them commented on any changes in the Persian order of 
battle, nor on the ability of their soldiers. Procopius was easily in a position to see 
such changes, given that his history covers two conflicts with the Persians, and the 
 specifically agrees with older texts that the Persian army’s main weapon 
was the bow, both used by the infantry and the heavy cavalry.154 Finally, there is no 
reason to assume that there was not already a standing army of sorts dating back to 
the earlier years of the dynasty. The Sassanids held several cities on the border with 
                                                  
151 Rubin 2000: 656-7.
152 Evagrius V.8-9 from
p.142.
153 Procopius  I.13.12-I.14.55 on  Dara and I.18 on Callinicum. Theophylact III.10.4-7 on 
Sargathon and III.15.8 on the Roman defeat in Armenia. 
154 Maurice  XI.1.
Strategikon 
Strategikon
 The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars Part II AD 363-630
Wars
Strategikon
67
Byzantine territory including Nisibis and Singara.155 These would have had 
garrisons, as would other fortresses along the border. Evidence for this can be 
gathered from Ammianus’ account of Julian’s campaign in Persia, particularly in the 
early phases.156 Further, by this point, the Persians had constructed fortifications in 
the Caspian Gates to defend against incursions by northern tribes157 and this would 
also have required a garrison on more or less permanent assignment.158 Admittedly, 
this would have probably consisted of archers and other infantry, supported perhaps 
by light cavalry patrols and a commander chosen from the , as the heavier 
 or  would have been of little use in a siege or in the mountain 
passes. However, there is no way to be certain about the composition, nor is it 
particularly important. The fact is that there were substantial forces deployed in 
cities and fortifications along the western and northern borders of the kingdom, and 
possibly on the eastern and southern frontiers as well, although the lack of 
information about these makes it harder to be certain. Given that this is true, there is 
no reason to assume that Khusrau’s military reforms were particularly innovative. 
They read more like an attempt to rebuild an army that has suffered from a sustained 
period of fighting and needed to be reformed and rebuilt.
The exception to all of this, of course, is the change in the command structure. Here 
again, we are unfortunately left unclear on the precise duties of a . Certainly 
they were military commanders, but how did they relate to the  who 
governed provinces on the frontiers? We simply do not know. However, there is no 
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evidence that there is a difference between the army of Shapur II and that of Khusrau 
I and his successors in terms of the command structure. During the 363 campaign, 
there were several Persian armies that appeared in the western theatre – one was 
commanded by a member of the House of Suren159 and another by one of the Mihran 
family.160 Earlier, Ammianus named Tamsapor as the western commander, with 
authority to make peace in the absence of the king.161 Similarly, in the reign of 
Hormizd IV, the principal general was Bahram Chobin, who led armies in two of the 
main theatres, first in the east and then in the west.162 Another Persian general of the 
same era was Tamchosro, of whom it is written in Theophylact that he was ‘invested 
with the command of the Persian armies in Armenia’,163 and after his death, he was 
succeeded by the Kardarigan.164 Later, in the reign of Khusrau II, there were three 
forces in the field at times – one led by Shahrvaraz, one by Shahin Patsgospan, and 
the third led by Rhahzadh.165 At no point did the king himself lead a major army in 
battle, although Khusrau II did act as a nominal head for campaigns that required the 
royal presence, such as those initiating the war against Byzantium in 602.166 Finally, 
during the reign of Yazdgird III, the forces on the southern frontier were initially led 
by Bahman at the Battle of the Bridge, while the regent Rustam remained in 
Ctesiphon with the .167
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On the other hand, given the lack of information regarding the precise details of 
Persian ranks and of who had which rank, it is not impossible that the only change 
was that from the king leading his armies in the field to generals doing it for him. As 
can be seen from Whitby’s article on the subject, there is evidence that a reform was 
instituted by Khusrau I that placed restrictions on the campaigning practices of the 
Persian king.168  This is not mentioned in al-Tabari’s account of his reign, instead 
only appearing in the accounts of John of Ephesus,169 Theophylact170 and 
Evagrius.171 Despite this, Whitby makes a convincing case for accepting that this law 
existed but it has not traditionally been included in the corpus of laws ascribed to 
Khusrau I by scholars such as Frye or Ghirshman presumably due to it not being 
included in the Arabic tradition.172 However, while it may not belong to the same 
period of his reign as the other changes, a claim that is impossible to substantiate due 
to the lack of any reliable method of dating them, it certainly ought in my opinion to 
be included with the greater number of changes that Khusrau made to the Persian 
laws.
With that established, the key to this law is that the evidence for it, as shown above, 
is contemporary to the period, and the effect can be seen in the decades following the 
date it was supposedly introduced. After all, following Khusrau I, no Sassanid 
 led an army to war in person, with the exception of Khusrau II who was 
present on four occasions but does not seem to have commanded in practice. 
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One assumption made by Frye is that the military reforms left the interior of Persia 
undefended because the soldiers were concentrated on the frontiers, referencing the 
Arab conquests as an example.173 This may have been true in times of war, but given 
the series of battles fought by the Muslims during their invasion, there is no evidence
that this was any truer after Khusrau’s reforms than it was before. While the 
permanent garrisons were all on the borders, the interior of Persia had always been 
reliant upon armies raised by the king to defend it, with the exceptions of those 
places with their own defenders. During the Islamic invasions, large numbers of 
Persian soldiers had already been killed or captured earlier in the campaign and thus 
were not available to the commanders defending Ctesiphon and other such places. 
This does not necessarily reflect an absolute lack of soldiers in the interior. In 
addition, the geography of the Sassanid state south of Ctesiphon left them with few 
potential defensive positions, unlike the Byzantine possessions in Syria, which may 
have contributed to the decision to place more soldiers there. It may also be true that 
Frye was basing his assumption on the campaigns of Heraclius inside Persian 
territory, but those are essentially a special case, as the bulk of the Persian armies 
were already deployed elsewhere and were unavailable to Khusrau II while the same 
was not normally true. 
Another statement made by Frye is that ‘the great nobles who had maintained private 
armies saw their power drastically reduced’ based on the statements made by al-
Tabari.174 However, there are two major problems with this statement as written. The 
first is that there is no evidence that the great nobles suffered any loss of influence or 
power. Following the reforms, the major commanders of armies and important 
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diplomats continued to be drawn from the powerful families such as the Suren and 
Mihran clans – examples include Bahram Chobin,175 Shahin Patgospan,176 or the 
anonymous Suren who participated in the negotiations recorded by Menander.177
These families had previously been the traditional commanders of Persian armies 
and nothing seems to have changed after the reign of Khusrau I. In fact, with the 
movement from one high command position to four, there was increased opportunity 
for the higher nobility to achieve power and status. The other problem with this 
statement is that there is reason to believe the opposite. In the years after the reign of 
Khusrau I, almost every monarch was overthrown by his or her own nobility. 
Clearly, whatever the changes had been intended to implement, they were
unsuccessful in taming the great families or even in limiting the danger that they 
posed to the . Indeed, the danger seems to have increased. 
Finally, there is a tendency to overemphasise the changes made to the army, in one 
direction or another. Frye places the  at the centre of the new army,178 while 
Ghirshman has Khusrau raise a ‘peasant army’179 and Rubin an elite standing 
army.180 All that can be said for certain from the passages of al-Tabari is that 
Khusrau reequipped the cavalry and other soldiers, and provided them with 
‘adequate financial allowances’, 181 a wonderfully vague term, while Theophylact 
stated that Persians were only paid for foreign campaigns.182 In short, the modern 
interpretations of the reforms that are supposed to have seen a major change in the 
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Sassanid army, in addition to being unsupported by contemporary evidence, are not 
supported in the primary source for the reforms themselves. Thus, while Khusrau 
clearly made some alterations to aspects of the military, it must be questioned 
whether these changes were as wide ranging or important as Frye or Ghirshman 
would believe. In fact, it would appear that the reforms to the military were minor 
and mostly concerned with aspects that are difficult to quantify such as the time 
taken to assemble the forces, the availability of weapons and their quality and other 
similar factors. What must be emphasised is that there is no basis for the reforms 
having any great effect on the ability of the Persian army to defeat its enemies or 
indeed any major changes to how it fought.
Aside from the military reforms, the two major classes into which it is possible to 
divide the reforms are the changes that Khusrau made to the legal system and the 
changes he made to the tax system. 
When [the great men of state and the nobles] had concluded their speeches, 
he stood up and delivered an oration. He began by mentioning God’s favours 
on His people when He had created them, and his own dependency on God 
for regulating their affairs and the provision of foodstuffs and the means of 
life for them. He left nothing [which ought to have been said] out of his 
oration. Then he told the people what they had suffered [through the 
spreading of Mazdak’s teachings]; namely, the loss of their possessions, the 
destruction of their religion and the damage to their position regarding their 
children and their means of life. He further informed them that he was 
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looking into ways and means of putting all that right and rendering affairs 
strong again, and urged the people to aid him in this.
Next, he ordered the heads of the leaders of the Mazdakites to be chopped off 
and their possessions to be shared out among the poor and needy.183 He killed 
a large number of those people who had confiscated other people’s 
possessions, and restored these possessions to their original owners. He 
commanded that every child concerning whom there was dispute before him 
about his or her origin should be attributed to that person in whose family the 
child was, when the real father was not known, and that the child should be 
given a [legal] share in the estate of the man to whom the child was now 
attributed, providing that the latter acknowledged the child. In regard to every 
woman who had been forced to give herself unwillingly to a man, that man 
was held to be to account and compelled to pay the bride price to her so that 
her family was thereby satisfied. Then the woman was to be given the choice 
between remaining with him or marrying someone else, except that if she had 
an original husband, she was to be restored to him. He further commanded 
that every man who had caused harm to another person in regard to his 
possessions, or who had committed an act of oppression against another 
person, should make full restitution and then be punished in a manner 
appropriate to the enormity of his offence. He decreed that, where those 
responsible for the upbringing of the children of leading families had died, he 
himself would be responsible for them. He married the girls among them to 
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their social equals and provided them with their bridal outfit and necessities 
out of the state treasury; and he gave the youths in marriage to wives from 
noble families, presented them with money for dowries, awarded them 
sufficient riches, and ordained that they should be members of his court so 
that he might call upon them for filling various of his state offices. 
He further ordained the digging of canals and the excavation of subterranean 
irrigation conduits, and provision of loans for the owners of agricultural lands 
and support for them. He likewise ordered the rebuilding of every wooden 
bridge or bridge of boats that had been destroyed and of every masonry 
bridge that had been smashed, and further ordered that every village that had 
fallen into ruin should be restored to a better state of prosperity than 
previously. He made enquiries about the cavalrymen of the army, and those 
lacking in resources he brought up to standard by allocating to them horses 
and equipment, and earmarked for them adequate financial allowances. He 
assigned overseers for the fire temples and provided good roads for the 
people. Along the highways he built castles and towers. He selected [good] 
administrators, tax officials, and governors, and gave the persons appointed 
to these functions stringent orders. He set himself to peruse the conduct, the 
writings, and the legal decisions of Ardashir, and took them as a model to 
imitate, urging the people to do likewise.184
This lengthy passage deals with both the changes that Khusrau made to the legal 
system and a number of more general changes he instituted that are not easily 
                                                  
184 Al-Tabari 897-8.
75
catalogued elsewhere. These can be further divided into necessary responses to the 
suppression of the Mazdakites at the beginning of his reign, relating mostly to the re-
establishment of laws regarding marriage and rape, and more general maintenance to 
the structure of the state. In the second category can be placed the repairs to bridges, 
canals and so on as well as the construction of new fortifications with their obvious 
advantages in military terms while the first provided equal opportunity to increase 
royal power through control of the next generation of nobility. 
The obvious reason for the reforms, and one that is mentioned towards the beginning 
of the passage quoted above, is the destruction caused by the Mazdakite sect, which 
was finally destroyed by Khusrau at the start of his reign.185 The leaders had their 
heads cut off, but sufficient damage had clearly been done to the social structures 
that there was a pressing need for repair. This is the key to the reforms of Khusrau I 
– the repair of the structures of society after a period of severe disruption. Innovation 
is not the goal here as can be seen from the appeal to the  Ardashir I, 
founder of the dynasty, and the laws that he made.186 It appears that there is an 
attempt here to link the changes made by Khusrau to the greatest of his forefathers, 
and while this may be nothing more than propaganda to justify his decisions, there is 
nothing in the text, barring a possibly apocryphal story about a scribe,187 that would 
indicate sustained resistance to these proposals from any one group, whether in al-
Tabari or in the more contemporary sources. Admittedly this is made extremely 
difficult by the lack of precise dating for the reforms, but the general assumption 
made by scholars is that they postdate the revolt of Khusrau’s brothers in the 530s 
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and come in the middle of his reign.188 Of course, one may postulate that this is 
incorrect, and date the reforms to the earlier years, but the height of his authority as 
monarch makes far more sense as the prestige of the king would have been an 
important part of pressing these changes through to completion, regardless of 
whether there was sustained opposition or not. On the other hand, dating them to the 
middle of his reign raises the question of why there is a reference to the Mazdakites, 
who were seemingly reduced to insignificance at the beginning of his reign.189
Due to the focus on the tax reforms and the military changes, the work that Khusrau 
I was responsible for in other fields often is glossed over or ignored.190 It is perhaps 
understandable because of the lack of any material on this section of the reforms, 
except al-Tabari, and thus there is little to say about it. However, it should be noted 
that Khusrau I had a reputation in later years for being a just king and that some 
measure of legal reform may have been part of it.191 Other than that, there is little 
evidence either way. Some measure of change is probable, and likely to have 
represented a return to the older ways of Persian society at least in name following 
the chaos spread by the Mazdakites. This explains the changes to the law regarding 
marriage, rape and the disposition of children without parents.192 There must have 
been a method of dealing with similar cases previously, but this may have codified 
the existing laws. In all, this points to a resumption of old standards of government 
following a period when they were inactive, complete with an appeal to an older 
time.
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The final part of Khusrau’s reforms, and the best documented are those dealing with 
the tax system. Here is a part of what al-Tabari had to say about it:193
The rulers of Persia before Kisra Anusharwan used to levy land tax on the 
administrative divisions, a third or quarter of fifth or sixth [of their produce], 
according to the water supply and the degree of cultivation; and poll tax 
according to a fixed sum. King Qubadh, son of Fayruz ordered, toward the 
end of his reign, a cadastral survey, comprising plains and mountains alike, 
so that the correct amount of land tax could be levied on the lands. This was 
carried out, except that Qubadh’s death supervened before that survey could 
be completed. Hence when his son Kisra succeeded to power, he gave orders 
for it to be carried through to its end and for an enumeration to be made of 
date palms, olive trees, and heads. He then ordered his secretaries to calculate 
the grand total of that, and he issued a general summons to the people. He 
commanded the secretary responsible for the land tax to read out to them the 
total tax liabilities from the land and the numbers of date palms, olive trees, 
and heads. The secretary read all this out to them, after which Kisra said to 
them, “We have judged it advisable to establish the rates of taxation on the 
basis of what has been enumerated of the various  of this cadastral 
survey – date palms, olive trees, and heads – and we ordain that the taxation 
should be paid in instalments spread over the year, in three instalments. In 
this way, sums of money will be stored in our treasuries so that, should any 
emergency arise along one of our vulnerable frontiers or on any one of our 
distant boundaries, a breech of the borders or anything else untoward, and we 
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have a need to deal with it and to nip it in the bud, involving the expenditure 
of money on this, we shall have money stored up here, ready and to hand, 
since we do not wish to have to levy a fresh instalment of taxation for that 
emergency. So what do you think about the procedure we have envisaged and 
agreed upon?”
This, then, would seem to be the most important part of the reforms undertaken by 
Khusrau – a fairly comprehensive survey and restructuring of the system by which 
the  gained his revenue. The survey was apparently begun by Kavad in 
the last years of his reign but was not completed either, as al-Tabari said, because 
Kavad died or due to the war with Byzantium intervening.194 Regardless, this was 
not completed until Khusrau’s reign, and this supposedly formed the basis for the 
reforms that he then undertook.
The key change that Khusrau seems to have made is that taxes were now collected 
three times a year as opposed to only once previously.195 This was supposedly to 
ensure that the state always had money to hand in case of emergency, such as an 
invasion, which is the quoted example,196 although it is questionable whether this 
would be any more efficient than the old system if this was the case. It should be 
noted that, despite the opinion of Rubin, there is no evidence that the Sassanid 
economy was dependent upon the tribute that the Byzantines provided.197 As shown 
by Henning Böerm, the quantities here were relatively small compared to the income 
of both governments and were more important for their propaganda value than their 
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financial assistance.198 In addition, there is no evidence to suggest that Rubin’s 
theory of a state with limited coinage is correct, nor that the reforms of Khusrau I 
were only a temporary measure that failed even during his lifetime.199 This links 
strongly into the military aspects, as Rubin supported the idea of an elite professional 
force that could not be sustained in the face of increasing financial difficulties 
following the failure of the financial reforms.200 Howard-Johnston took a different 
approach, suggesting that al-Tabari gave us only a ‘simplified picture of central 
elements of the reform’.201 His conclusion was that, while the reforms were an 
‘important episode in the domestic history of the Sasanian empire’,202 it was not a 
‘fundamental restructuring of the fiscal or governmental system’.203 Al-Tabari did 
not comment on the success or failure of the reforms, but the evidence for any new 
professional force is lacking. In addition, Theophylact stated that ‘Persians do not 
receive payments from the treasury, not even when they are assembled in their 
villages and fields’.204 The question must be asked then, if the king did not need to 
pay his soldiers under the traditional system and there was no new system, for what 
was the additional income needed to pay? 
The obvious answer would be the other reforms that Khusrau undertook as noted 
above – rebuilding bridges and villages and refitting the cavalry.205 All of these 
reforms would have cost money and if we accept the portrayal that the previous 
system of taxing was inefficient compared to the new one, it may simply have been 
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that Khusrau needed the money in the short term to pay for the construction and 
other projects, but that he also wanted it for the long term so that the king would 
have more resources to hand. In addition, the article by Whitby noted that various 
units served in the Persian armies for pay – ‘either foreigners attracted into Persian 
service like the federates in Roman armies or internal mercenaries’.206 Considering 
the ongoing wars that consumed much of his reign, it is logical that Khusrau would 
have wanted access to larger numbers of mercenaries than previously had been the 
case and would have taken steps towards that end. He may also have wished to fill 
the treasury.
Equally, while it is unlikely that Khusrau founded a new elite professional force, it 
remains probable that there were Persian soldiers stationed in garrisons that required 
salary as well as money to maintain the fortifications and the arsenals in readiness 
for war. As stated previously, there is evidence for defensive positions on the frontier 
at locations such as Nisibis and Singara,207 as well as the fort of Biraparakh in the 
Caspian Gates.208 While an argument could be made that the troops stationed on the 
borders were not paid directly as stated in Theophylact,209 the suggestion in the 
account of John of Lydus that the Romans were meant to pay the Persians for the 
common defence rather than providing troops themselves suggests that the Persian 
garrison was indeed paid, soldiers that were certainly still present in 561 at least.210
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However, any suggestion that this tax system was intended to weaken the power of 
the nobles is undermined by al-Tabari:211
They imposed the poll tax on everyone except for people from noble 
families, great men, warriors, herbadhs, secretaries, and those in the king’s 
service, and made them liable for it according to four levels, of twelve, eight, 
six and four dirhams according to the richness or poverty of the person in 
question.
Clearly, this merely reinforced the status of these groups as the elite of the empire, 
rather than in any way reducing their power. If Khusrau had truly intended to 
weaken their power, there were more effective methods with which to achieve his 
goal. For example, Honorius had attempted to curb the power of the Senate by taxing 
them. He had failed, but it was an attempt at least – ‘Honorius had to rescind 
legislation aimed at extracting recruits from senatorial estates...’.212
As I said, it seems unusual that a state should choose to take its revenue in three 
stages rather than one, particularly if we are to assume as al-Tabari indicated that this 
was an improvement. Under normal circumstances, this would have provided no 
extra funds, merely the same in three portions. Thus, it is hard to see why it would
benefit Khusrau to do this. I have two suggestions, but both are only supposition. 
First, as noted in the passage above, the survey counted date palms, olive trees and 
heads for taxation.213 This may have been the division, if there was a difference 
between the time when the olives and the dates were harvested of sufficient duration 
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to allow for this. Alternatively, it is possible that it was done to allow for the harvest 
in different regions of the empire to be collected before it spoiled. It is impossible to 
be certain from what little we know. In addition, the text in al-Tabari does not 
mention grain, which was almost certainly the most common product of the empire. 
As such, the question of whether the passage on the tax section is complete must be 
asked, and the only answer can be that we do not know.
To conclude, there are many interpretations of the reforms of Khusrau I to be found, 
some of which place greater emphasis on certain aspects than others. My own 
opinion is that it is easy to place more importance upon these reforms than they truly 
merit. With the possible exception of the tax reforms, there appear to have been no 
extreme changes, nothing revolutionary. Contrary to the views of historians such as 
Christensen or Frye, the great nobles retained the bulk of their power after the 
reforms, even acquiring more due to the increased opportunities to command armies. 
The changes made to the legal system and the appeals to an older time seem to 
support a return to the days before the Mazdakites and the damage that their ideals 
may have inflicted upon the fabric of society. Khusrau’s building programme would 
appear to be impressive but it was mostly concerned with repairing damaged bridges 
and roads, although he did construct new fortifications. Even the tax reforms seem 
designed primarily to support the efforts of the other changes, providing the revenue 
necessary to construct castles and to re-equip cavalry units.
The only reform that appears to be entirely new is the law that restricts the 
campaigning practices of the king. It is also the only one ascribed to Khusrau by a 
contemporary source and although it is not traditionally included in the corpus of 
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changes – it is not, for example, mentioned by Frye or Rubin – it deserves to be 
analysed as part of the programme of Khusrau I. Clearly he had a goal in mind –
returning the country he ruled to the state that it had enjoyed under Ardashir I. There 
is little evidence, other than the law regarding the campaigns, that Khusrau was a 
great innovator, although he ought to be remembered as the king who presided over 
the golden age of the Sassanid empire.
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C H A P T E R    T H R E E
As with the earlier king, Kavad, Khusrau II encountered difficulties in establishing 
his rule over Sassanid Persia. His problems, however, stemmed from a different 
source and were not entirely of his own making. This case study provides an 
opportunity to examine the relations between a Sassanid king, who would take his 
empire to arguably the apogee of its power, and his nobles and soldiers at the 
beginning of his time in power. 
The roots of the problem lay in the reign of his father, Hormizd IV. His great 
general, Bahram Chobin, had defeated the Turks and the Hephthalite Huns allied to 
them, and had then been sent to the west by the  to face the Byzantine 
armies there. He had won his initial confrontation with them, but had then lost to a 
second army. Hormizd used this opportunity to try and belittle his overly proud 
subject, and apparently decided to send him a woman’s clothes and a spindle.214 The 
implication remains as clear today as it did then, and Bahram’s response was to 
march on Ctesiphon. This is the version given by Theophylact.215 Sebeos and the 
, however, do not record him being sent to the west at all, and date his 
rebellion to the aftermath of the battle against the Turks, the cause being that 
Hormizd was dissatisfied by the portion of the treasure sent to him by Bahram.216 In 
either case, Hormizd had insulted Bahram, who retained the loyalty of his army and 
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began to march towards the Persian capital, which seems to have been largely 
unprotected.
No effective resistance materialised. Instead, Hormizd was seized by his brothers-in-
law, Bindoe and Bistam, who had him blinded before making their nephew, Khusrau 
II, the new .217 All accounts feature the overthrow of Hormizd, noting 
also that, by this point, he had alienated nearly all of the nobility and the priests.218
Certainly, no one is recorded as supporting his cause in the accounts, and he was 
simply left to linger once he had been removed from the throne, although the 
 recorded that he was strangled by Bindoe and Bistam as they fled from 
Ctesiphon in the face of Bahram’s army.219 Nevertheless, nothing that Khusrau could 
say appeased Bahram, and he continued to approach.220 Accompanied by at least one 
and possibly both of his uncles,221 Khusrau fled westwards to the Byzantine empire, 
reaching the city of Circesium in early 590222 from where he wrote letters to the 
Emperor Maurice. This is recorded in both Theophylact and Sebeos. The version in 
Sebeos follows:223
Give me the throne and royal station of my fathers and ancestors; send me an 
army in support with which I may be able to defeat my enemy; and restore 
my kingdom; [then] I shall be your son. I shall give you the regions of Syria 
– all Aruastan as far as the city of Nisibis – and of Armenia the area of 
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 authority as far as Ayrarat and the city of Dvin, and up to the shore 
of the lake of Bznunik’ and to Arestawan; and a great part of the land of 
Iberia, as far as the city of Tp’khis. Let us observe a pact of peace between us 
until the death of us both; and let this oath be secure between us and between 
our sons who will reign after us.
Theophylact had him send two messages, 224 one urging ‘the garrison of 
Martyropolis to surrender to the Romans’225 and one to the Emperor as in Sebeos 
asking for his help in restoring him to his throne. In return, he offered substantial 
concessions in territory and promised not to ask for subsidies in future.226 These 
were important concessions, and despite some apparent misgivings on the part of the 
Senate, Maurice decided to aid Khusrau.227 He sent the exiled king an army, and 
with this and the support of the Armenians and his kinsmen, Khusrau defeated 
Bahram and forced him to flee east to the Turks whom he had previously defeated.228
Following this, and the establishment of Khusrau as , he decided to 
execute his two uncles, Bindoe and Bistam, for the crime of murdering his father 
Hormizd.229 Bindoe was at court at the time, and was thus seized and killed, possibly 
drowned in the Tigris according to Theophylact,230 but Bistam was absent and thus 
was able to escape to the north where he maintained a resistance to his nephew for 
several years before finally being murdered by one of his allies (possibly a Turk231), 
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at which point the rebellion faltered,232 although the dating is still debated by 
historians.233 This seems to have marked the end of organised internal resistance to 
Khusrau II, although the focus in the sources from 602 is on the war with Byzantium 
rather than the internal situation in Persia. 
From the above, there are a number of points that can be made about the relationship 
between the Sassanid  and their most powerful subjects, particularly in 
the wake of the reforms of Khusrau I. In addition, the importance of family is an 
important theme, and the necessity for the king to control his army is demonstrated. 
To begin with, family and the ties that it brought were crucial to the pattern of 
events. The most important figures allied to Khusrau II during the first parts of his 
reign were his maternal uncles Bistam and Bindoe. They are noted as supporting him 
because their sister was the wife of Hormizd, and Bosworth speculated in his notes 
on al-Tabari that they were the sons of one of the nobles whom Hormizd IV killed 
early in his own rule,234 leading to their attempt to take revenge. Ironically it is this 
revenge that is the primary motivation behind their deaths at Khusrau’s orders once 
he is secure on the throne.235 In addition, Bahram’s closest advisor in al-Tabari’s 
account seems to be his sister and wife, Kurdiyah.236
So, from the above list, it is clear that family members were tied together tightly, as 
Khusrau’s uncles supported him against Bahram, but there may have been other 
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reasons. While little is known about Hormizd’s wife or wives, it is clear that 
Khusrau later had at least two wives, one being Shirin and another being the mother 
of Kavad-Shiroe.237 Another may have been Maria, named in the sources as the 
daughter of the Byzantine emperor Maurice, although the evidence for this is far 
from conclusive.238 In any case, while all the children of Khusrau II and other 
 would have had the same father, they may well have had different 
mothers. This would lead to a system where the position of a potential heir might 
depend more on his mother’s favour with the king than his own merits. Thus, 
support would be derived more from the maternal family than the paternal, given that 
any brothers of the current king would be potential competitors for the crown rather 
than potential supporters as demonstrated by the late third century when three of the 
five kings directly following Shapur I were his sons – first Homizd I, then Bahram I 
and finally Narses after Bahram II and III. Thus, given that the mother of Khusrau II 
was a member of one of the seven greatest Persian families, 239 Khusrau would have 
derived support through this link as he represented an opportunity for that family to 
gain status, wealth and power through his patronage, whereas the reverse would 
potentially have been true under Bahram, who was a member of the Mihran 
family.240
There is one interesting and useful comparison to be drawn between the importance 
of the mother in Sassanid court politics and an earlier time. In particular the 
polygamous practices of the Hellenistic kings mirror it in many ways. In the courts 
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of the Successor kingdoms, as Daniel Ogden discussed in his work 
,241 the lack of a defined structure of succession allowed the 
wives and courtesans who surrounded the king to play the key part in deciding who 
out of the many potential heirs would take his place. Fortunes could vary depending 
on which of the wives or concubines were in favour at any given point. This 
situation with competing children sharing the same father but different mothers is 
known as amphimetrism. Ogden also noted, and these are also factors that apply to 
the Sassanids, that having many wives allowed the kings to minimise the risk of a 
particular queen being infertile and reduced the risk of all the children dying in 
childhood. This would have been important in this time, even in the more medically 
advanced east. Finally, the abundance of heirs allowed the king to have the medieval 
‘heir and spare’ so that, should one die or be disqualified from taking the throne for 
any reason or simply be not suitable in his father’s opinion, there were other options. 
An example of this in Sassanid history is Khusrau I, who had two elder brothers. 
Kavad’s eldest son, Caoses, was passed over by his father because ‘he was by no 
means pleasing to [Kavad]’242 and his middle son Zames had lost an eye and thus 
was disqualified on the grounds of deformity.243 Interestingly Khusrau is specified in 
the account as the son of the sister of Aspebedes, who appears to have been a Persian 
noble of some importance given his other activities noted in Procopius.244 In both 
cases, he is specifically noted to be the uncle of Khusrau, but no indication is given 
of his relationship with either of the other sons, and the way Procopius described the 
connection strongly implies that he was not related to either Caoses or Zames: ‘But 
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Chosroes, who was born to him by the sister of Aspebedes…’245 and ‘Among these 
was Aspebedes, the brother of Chosroes’ mother’.246
There is one other important aspect to the way that family was regarded in the 
sources. This was the way that the families to which the claimants belonged also 
played a part disproportionate to the direct support accrued through them. Khusrau, 
as the king and the heir of the Sassanid family, had a definite edge in this area over 
Bahram. Bahram instead was descended through the Mihran family, which was one 
of the seven great families, from the former Arsacid ruling house that had been 
overthrown three hundred years earlier by Ardashir I, who founded the Sassanid 
dynasty.247 Obviously, this allowed Khusrau to claim that he was the legitimate heir 
in his relations with Maurice, with none of the internal dynastic issues that a 
confrontation with a blood relation would have brought.248 However, Bahram may 
have asserted that his claim to the throne though the Arsacid family predated, and 
thus preceded, that of the Sassanid house. Certainly in a letter that Sebeos claimed he 
wrote to the Armenians, he stated ‘so that you and I in unison might remove that 
universal scourge, the house of Sasan…’.249 There is no attempt here to draw a 
connection between the royal family and his own; instead he took a diametrically 
opposed position, setting himself up to be the champion of those whom the 
Sassanids did not represent. In the letter, for example, he promised the Armenians 
freedom from both empires, to give them their kingdom back.250 This was written 
before the battle in which Bahram was defeated, so it may have been simply a tactic 
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to shift the support of the Armenians from Khusrau to himself, as he had tried before 
when he offered substantial territorial concessions to Maurice in return for Roman 
support.251 In both cases, his proposal was refused - the Armenians perhaps believed 
either that he would not fulfil his promise once the war was over or that they would 
be able to get a better reward from Khusrau.252 In fact, it might not have been seen to 
be in their best interests to have a separate Armenian state stranded between the two 
empires, as the nobles were able to wield more power in the service of the Persian 
, as seen in the career of Smbat Bagratuni, than if they had to rule their 
own country.
Besides the importance of family in noble power struggles, however, there was 
another important factor: one that was linked to the policies of Khusrau I. His reform 
of the army had left it partially funded by the state rather than the great nobles,253
which has been interpreted as reducing the dependency of the king on them when 
waging war.254 However, the commanders of the army were still nobles and the reign 
of Hormizd is an excellent demonstration of why there were still potentially very 
serious problems with the system. 
Most of the sources, with the exception of al-Tabari who described Hormizd as ‘a 
successful and victorious commander…’,255 do not suggest that he participated in 
any campaigns, and in fact the implication in Sebeos is that Bahram (and presumably 
other commanders on other fronts) fought in his name throughout his reign. It is 
inexplicable that Hormizd made no effort to secure the allegiance of the other 
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military commanders. It must be assumed from their lack of intervention in the 
events that saw Hormizd overthrown that they did not support him. Admittedly, the 
far eastern army would have been hard pressed to march west in time, but the fact 
that Khusrau II fled west would suggest that either he or his advisors did not 
consider their support strong enough to fight Bahram directly following the defection 
of the forces stationed at Nisibis256 and the failure of such troops as Khusrau had 
been able to rally to stop Bahram.257 Furthermore it would seem unusual, in a culture 
that seemed to prize its martial identity so highly,258 for a king not to go on at least 
one campaign, particularly as Hormizd was at war for all of his reign whether it was 
against the Byzantines or the Turks or both. The best explanation for this is the law 
recorded in differing forms by Theophylact, Evagrius, and John of Ephesus, limiting 
the campaigns which the  commanded in person.
This would make the most sense, although it remains uncertain if the law existed as 
such, or whether it simply was a custom that acquired the weight of tradition. 
Regardless, as Whitby suggests, it may have come from a desire to maintain the 
personal prestige of the , as this was important to a ‘wide variety of 
activities, diplomatic negotiations, military confrontations, or ceremonial activities at 
court, and Persian kings were rightly jealous of their standing’,259 as were their 
Roman counterparts.  As the son of Khusrau I, Hormizd would have been the most 
likely to observe this, whether it was a law or a tradition, which explains why he 
does not seem to have been a military commander at any point. In addition, he may 
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not have been suited to it and decided that it was better to leave it to those with the 
skills to wage war effectively. This would have been a wise idea, if he had not 
allowed himself to become separated from his soldiers. The implication in Sebeos is 
that the soldiers were more loyal to Bahram than Hormizd because he was the one 
who had rewarded them with the treasure from the battle, whereas Hormizd 
apparently sent troops to seize the treasure, presumably in preparation to redistribute 
it:260
Now when King Ormizd saw the messengers who had come with the news, 
and had read the army’s letter of greeting, and had received the gifts – the 
share of booty from the precious royal treasure – although he was outwardly 
joyful and humoured the men, yet inwardly he exclaimed in anger: “The feast 
is exceedingly grand, and I acknowledge the token of this portion. But from 
such great treasures it was not right to send to court [merely] this much.”
Then instead of a letter of greeting he ordered a letter to be written in very 
angry terms, which he despatched by a company of auxiliaries and royal 
guards, with orders to go to the army and seize the whole treasure. They went 
and began to demand it. Then all the troops were galvanised.
While this would be consistent with Whitby’s suggestion that the Sassanid dynasty 
prized their dignity and prestige above all,261 and it is certainly possible that Hormizd 
viewed the distribution of the plunder by Bahram as both superseding his own 
authority and insulting him with a lesser amount than would be appropriate, the 
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sources do not suggest that Bahram had any plans to rebel before he was provoked 
by Hormizd.262 It is important to be careful with the later sources, such as al-Tabari 
and the  because of the later view of Bahram as a hero who fell from 
grace,263 but there is no suggestion of premeditation in the Roman or Armenian 
traditions either, who would have had nothing to gain from hiding it, and could have 
used it to prove the perfidy of the Persians. Thus, while Bahram may have sent 
Hormizd a lesser amount than the  felt appropriate, it is probable that it 
was still the share that the king was entitled to from the plunder. A possible 
explanation may be found in the , which had Bahram taking some of the 
treasure for himself before sending the rest back to the court, but this is not 
mentioned in any of the other sources.264 In fact, the only consistent fact present is 
that Bahram was insulted by Hormizd in some fashion and he, with his army, 
revolted as a result. 
Thus, while Hormizd may have been on campaign during the reign of his father, 
there is no record of him doing so in his own reign. He had essentially allowed the 
local commanders to come between him and his soldiers, which may have associated 
them more closely in the minds of the army with the rewards and victory than the 
distant king in Ctesiphon. While Hormizd still had at least some soldiers to hand, 
presumably his personal guard and other troops in or around Ctesiphon, Bahram was 
able to take the throne because he had the soldiers from the quarter of the army that 
he had commanded, whether that was the Byzantine frontier and the garrison of 
Nisibis or the eastern frontier and his army fresh from victory against the Turks.
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There is one interesting fact about this part of the account. According to 
Theophylact, Bahram was defeated in battle by the Byzantines, which resulted in his 
dismissal by Hormizd.265 Further, he does not seem to have been in command of that 
army for long, potentially only a single campaign season or perhaps two. Thus, while 
he may have brought some soldiers with him from the east, the bulk of the army 
would not have known him for very long and their impressions would have been 
shaped by a single victory and a single defeat. This hardly seems to be the basis for 
an army willing to rebel against the rightful king for the sake of a general whom they 
barely knew, even one who must have had great personal charisma. If, on the other 
hand, Hormizd had threatened to discipline the entire army, or Bahram said that he 
had, that would be another matter. The garrison of Nisibis which joined Bahram was 
noted to be disaffected due to a recent defeat and afraid of punishment, so this might 
be the best explanation for the widespread revolt.266 In particular, Hormizd did not 
have the close links to the army that would be needed to counter its loyalty to the 
immediate commander. 
Whatever the reason, this does not seem to have held true for Khusrau II once he 
took the throne. Al-Tabari267 and the  recorded battles between 
Bahram and Khusrau before the latter fled to Byzantine territory, while Theophylact 
also recorded a military confrontation,269 and this means that he must have had a 
number of soldiers if the reports are true. Presumably it would have been comparable 
in size to that of Bahram if not in skill although neither source gives any specific 
details. Furthermore, Persian soldiers fought on his side along with the Byzantine 
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troops sent by Maurice and, as king, he was able to muster an army later to defeat the 
rebellion of Bistam. Admittedly his family connections were important in the first 
two cases, as Bistam and Bindoe provided at least 8,000 Persian cavalry for the later 
campaign according to Sebeos270 while al-Tabari wrote that  ‘Binduyah and a man 
from the Isbahbadhs of that region called Mushil with forty thousand warriors met 
up with him there…’.271 While some of those were certainly Armenians, there may 
have been a strong Persian complement as well, including the garrison of Nisibis and 
perhaps the other border fortresses.272 Clearly, Khusrau was able to assemble 
significant numbers of soldiers.
One possible reason for this is that he had not managed to alienate the nobility and 
priests as his father had. Hormizd had, by the time that al-Tabari and the other 
Arabic authors were writing, acquired a reputation for favouring the common people 
at the expense of the nobility and priesthood – ‘he [Hormizd] was anxious to behave 
towards his subjects with justice but implacable against the great men of the 
kingdom, because of their oppressing the lowly folk’273 and ‘he provided well for the 
mass of troops, but deprived the cavalrymen of resources’.274 By contrast, there is no 
suggestion in the sources that Khusrau had any particular problems with his nobility 
or that he favoured the common people over them. In contrast, the group he 
favoured, at least to begin with, were the Christians.
‘This cross I, Khusro, king of kings, son of Khusro (have sent). Because of 
the diabolic action and evil-doing of the most ill-fated Bahram Gushnasp and 
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the cavalrymen with him, we fled to Roman territory; and because the ill-
fated Zatsparham came with an army to Nisibis to incite the cavalry of the 
district of Nisibis, we too sent cavalrymen with a commander to Charcha. 
And through the fortune of the all-holy and famous saint Sergius, since we 
had heard that he was the granter of petitions, in the first year of our reign, on 
7th January, we petitioned that, if our cavalrymen should slay or capture 
Zatsparham, we would send a jewelled cross to his home. And on 9th 
February they brought the head of Zatsparham to us. Therefore, having 
granted our request, because each element was unambiguous, we sent to his 
all-holy name this cross, which had come into our possession, together with 
the cross sent by Justinian, emperor of the Romans, to his house, and which, 
in the time of the estrangement of our two states, had been brought here by 
Khusro, king of kings, son of Kavadh, our father, and was found among our 
treasures. (These crosses we have sent) to the house of the all-holy saint 
Sergius.’275
As the above shows, Khusrau had no problems with seeking help from any source 
open to him, although he seems personally to have remained a Zoroastrian. 
However, he had at least one Christian wife, Shirin who appears to have come from 
Khuzistan, as she is listed as an Aramaean in the .276 Equally 
there are a number of other written sources that listed Khusrau as being a patron of 
St. Sergius’ shrine as well as various other donations that the  made to 
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Christian churches.277 Interestingly, these churches seem to have been outside the 
borders of the empire. This was in addition to the prominence of Christians at 
court,278 which was not limited to Shirin, and may have resulted from the good 
relations that Khusrau had with the Byzantine empire under Maurice. Regardless, 
this is likely to have played a part in the decision of the Armenians to back Khusrau 
rather than Bahram, and again there were Armenians who held high positions under 
Khusrau such as the aforementioned Smbat Bagratuni who was a  for eight 
years.279 There is no evidence for any revolt by the Persian nobility against Khusrau 
in this period, so this must have been balanced by the promotion of more traditional 
Persian nobility to equivalent positions that are simply not recorded.
To conclude, the situation that resulted in the overthrow of Hormizd IV was mostly a 
result of his own mistakes, particularly his alienation of the higher nobility and 
Bahram Chobin in particular. This led directly to his overthrow because he no longer 
had any significant hold over the levers of power in the Sassanid state. As in the case 
of Kavad and his dealing with the Mazdakite sect, a king could survive with the 
backing of one major power group, but not when all of them were opposed to him. 
Secondly, the reforms of Khusrau I had mitigated the reliance on the nobility for 
troops, but as the senior commanders were still noble by birth, the possibility existed 
that a commander would be able to do what Bahram did and turn them against the 
king whether by force of personality or because the king had failed to build the 
necessary bond with his soldiery. Hormizd failed on both counts. 
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It also shows the importance of family in the Sassanid power struggle. Khusrau II 
succeeded because he was able to capitalise on the advantage his relationship to 
Bindoe and Bistam lent him. This gave him the power base he needed to make 
himself a credible alternative to Bahram as opposed to a puppet of his uncles or other 
nobles. Equally, his decision, conscious or not, to marry a Christian and to make 
donations to churches may have secured the support of Armenia and it certainly 
cannot have had a negative effect upon the Byzantine decision, particularly in 
retrospect. Finally, the nobility cannot be said to have lost any power since the 
events of the reign of Kavad a century earlier. They were still capable of 
overthrowing their ruler, and their support was crucial to the eventual success of 
Khusrau II.
There is little to be said on the relations between Khusrau and his nobility for the 
bulk of his reign. Following the end of the rebellion led by Bistam, the sources are 
focussed on the war rather than affairs within Persia. While there is more evidence 
for the continued role of the nobility as commanders of the armies, it is not until the 
end of his reign that the details of the interactions become apparent. Khusrau II was 
perhaps the greatest of the Sassanid monarchs, if we are to measure greatness simply 
in terms of territory ruled. At the height of his power, his word was law from the 
plateau of Anatolia to the Indus River and as far south as Egypt. In less than twenty 
years, Persian armies had restored the borders of the Achaemenid Empire. But it was 
not to last, and the Persian nobility bore at least part of the responsibility. 
Before turning to the end of Khusrau’s reign, there was one significant member of 
the nobility who was particularly relevant to this discussion. His name was Smbat 
100
Bagratuni,  of Vrkan280 and bearer of the title ‘Khosrov Shum’ or ‘joy of 
Khosrov’.281 An Armenian formerly in the service of the Byzantine Emperor, he later 
rose high in the favour of Khusrau II presumably due to his success in battle, 
although Sebeos did not preserve the details. However, Sebeos was clear on the point 
that Smbat owed his position and power entirely to Khusrau:282
It happened at that time that Smbat Bagratuni became pleasing in the eyes of 
king Khosrov. He gave him the  of the land of Vrkan, made him 
prince over all that region, and favoured him even more with honours and 
authority. He heaped gold and silver on him, and robed him in expensive and 
splendid garments. He gave him the belt and sword that had belonged to his 
own father Ormizd. He put under his command Persian and Armenian troops, 
and ordered him to go to the land of his appointment.
From this evidence, it is to be understood that the  retained control of the 
precise balance of power within the nobility. Those who were already members of 
the great houses perhaps had a safety net of sorts from their own estates, but the 
choice of who to appoint to  or to the command of soldiers remained in 
the hands of the king. As was evident a century earlier with the career of Seoses, it 
was possible for the king to reward his favourites so long as he did not threaten the 
interests of the nobility as a whole or of the principle factions at court, as shown by 
the overthrow of Kavad but also by that of Khusrau II.
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By 628, the war between the Byzantine and Persian empires had nearly come to an 
end. Despite conquering most of the Byzantine provinces east of the Hellespont, the 
Sassanids had failed to destroy the military now led by the Emperor Heraclius. 
Constantinople continued to hold out against the Persians’ Avar allies and there were 
no signs that the Persians intended to take a direct hand in the siege.283 An enemy 
army led by Heraclius had entered the heart of Persian territory and defeated the 
forces sent against it. Only a single Sassanid army remained in the field, and it was 
to play no direct role in the ensuing events.284
Following the battle of Nineveh, Khusrau II fled from Dastagird back to Ctesiphon, 
which had not yet fallen into Byzantine hands.285 While there are some variations in 
the sources concerning the details of events after this, the picture as a whole remains 
quite clear. At least a part of the nobility led by or including Khusrau’s son Kavad-
Siroes overthrew the  and then had him murdered along with his other 
sons. The variations are primarily in the motivation of the nobles, their leaders and 
the details of the coup and the death of Khusrau, and can broadly be traced to various 
historical traditions. For example, Theophanes and the  are in 
agreement in almost all respects while the accounts in Sebeos and al-Tabari vary. In 
only one respect do the other accounts seem to be preferable to Theophanes. This is 
the death of Khusrau. With the exception of Theophanes, who wrote that he was 
executed on the command of Kavad-Siroes with many arrows,286 the sources that 
record his death (the ,287 the  and al-Tabari289) 
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instead note that he was killed by a Persian named Mehr-Hormizd although his 
precise identity varies between them. Sebeos merely stated that Khusrau was killed 
at Kavad-Siroes’ order but not the method290 and Movses Daskhuranst’i wrote that 
his head was removed by a sword, thus agreeing with al-Tabari and the others in all 
but the weapon used.291 It would seem that the story involving Mehr-Hormizd is the 
most likely one – he appears in all but Sebeos and the Byzantine sources, and there is 
a degree of consistency between them that suggests they are at the least drawing on a 
common tradition. In addition, the Persian sources would have been in a better 
position than Theophanes to learn exactly how Khusrau died, and it is likely that the 
details were not passed along to Heraclius or to the source for the 
. Finally, the emphasis in the Roman tradition is on how Khusrau was a 
wicked man, who had blasphemed against God and had been cast down because of 
it, thus adopting a traditional theme from Greek tragedy or the Bible.292 Khusrau had 
been a great king and had grown overly proud which led him to hubris and caused 
him to commit terrible sins. As a result God, in the view of Theophanes and the 
, had sent Heraclius to be his nemesis. Having Khusrau die an 
ignoble death, trapped in the fortress he had built for his ill-gotten wealth, starved, 
insulted and abandoned before finally being shot down like a wild beast would no 
doubt have both fitted the theme and appealed to the writers. 
Of course, the question remained of why the nobility would wish to overthrow 
Khusrau II. After all, up until the last two years, Persia had had a very successful 
war. Sassanid generals had conquered Syria and Palestine, Anatolia and Egypt. All 
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of these remained in Persian hands, with Shahrvaraz’s army still in enemy territory 
as well, it may be presumed, as garrisons of the conquered cities. Given that the 
nobility were at the forefront of the campaign, fighting as  or 
heavy cavalry or as commanders of armies, they would have been in a position to 
gain great wealth for themselves and their families as well as glory on the field of 
battle. And some probably did. However, while war did have its advantages for a 
Persian noble, there were also disadvantages. After all, the war had now entered its
twenty-fifth year. Children born as it began would now have grown and been 
recruited to serve in the army as well. An entire generation of Persians had been 
reduced significantly by the casualties, while many of them would have spent long 
periods of time away from home. Then there were the taxes required to pay for it in 
addition to the drain on the economy. It should be noted here that at least two field 
armies were active for the entirety of the war under the generals Farrokhan, better 
known as Shahrvaraz, and Shahin Patgospan, with a third operating against 
Heraclius led by Rhahzadh in the previous year. In addition, there were the garrisons 
necessary to hold the conquered territories. All of these soldiers would have had to 
come from the western provinces of the Empire to avoid draining the garrisons 
protecting the eastern frontier. Although this was the most fertile part of the Empire, 
the reduction in the number of available farmers is unlikely to have been significant, 
although our lack of information on the recruiting practices of the Persian army 
makes it difficult to know how many of those fighting in the west were farmers or 
how many prisoners were sent back to the heartlands of the Empire to make up any 
shortfalls.
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However, the Persians no longer appeared to be winning the war. While they had 
conquered the bulk of the Byzantine Empire, they had no way to take Constantinople 
and finish their conquest. Equally, the bulk of the Persian armies were now tied up in 
the West, including the elite of their troops, garrisoning the conquered territories or 
simply in their winter encampments. More importantly, a Byzantine army had now 
invaded Mesopotamia - the heart of the Empire - and defeated a Persian army on its 
own ground, and destroyed one of the great temples of the Zoroastrian faith which 
had been dedicated to the  in particular at Gandzak.293 Thus, while the 
Sassanids retained the upper hand overall, the devastation of their heartlands by the 
Byzantines showed that the enemy was now in a position to potentially decapitate 
the Empire while they could not do the same. 
In addition, while the most recent events might have been the trigger, it is also 
possible that it was because they provided an opportunity. It would not be the first 
time that Mesopotamia had been invaded by Roman armies, and the previous 
attempts had usually ended in disaster as with that of Julian the Apostate in 363. If 
Khusrau had been able to hold on long enough to recall troops from the East or from 
elsewhere in the occupied territories, he might have been able to win the war by 
destroying Heraclius before he could retreat. If he had done so, and thus potentially 
captured or killed the Byzantine Emperor, his prestige would have been untouchable. 
It is possible that Kavad-Siroes and the nobles with him gambled that they could 
overthrow Khusrau and then recall Shahrvaraz or the eastern armies themselves, thus 
taking the credit for the victory.  Even if this was not the case, there would be no 
better opportunity to overthrow Khusrau than in the chaos following the battle of 
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Nineveh and to wait would only allow the Byzantines to inflict further damage on 
the Empire. 
With all this in mind, it is difficult to establish the precise motives of the plotters. 
Fear may have played a part, particularly if they were survivors of Nineveh, that 
either Khusrau would punish them for their failure or would order them to face the 
victorious Byzantines again. Neither prospect can have been terribly appealing. 
Some of them may have calculated that Kavad-Siroes would be a more controllable 
ruler than his father, particularly given the situation in Persia and the reduction of 
central power. As he would need the nobility, they would be able to control him, 
which had not been true of Khusrau at any point of his reign. As for Kavad-Siroes 
himself, he may have been motivated by fear of the favour that Khusrau was now 
showing Merdanshah, his son by Shirin.294 Finally, Khusrau had managed to alienate 
Shahrvaraz at least partially, and thus another reason may have been that the nobles 
realised that their only hope of recalling his army was to replace the . 
The position and actions of the Persian army led by Shahrvaraz were crucial to the 
events that unfolded. He commanded the last intact Persian army in the field and one 
that remained in control of enemy territory.295 In addition, as he had been successful 
in most battles to this point, it is not difficult to imagine that Shahrvaraz’s personal 
prestige and popularity with his army were both high. As noted previously, he did 
not move to assist Khusrau II against Heraclius in 628 and this has been explained 
previously by assuming that either Shahrvaraz had come to an agreement with 
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Heraclius296 or that he was a part of the coup, if only from a distance.297 The
principal source that claimed this is Theophanes, although the  also 
implicated the general in events.298 However, this evidence is not concrete. 
Theophanes presented two pieces of evidence regarding the conduct of Shahrvaraz in 
the year in question. First he wrote that Khusrau, persuaded that his general had 
betrayed him to the Romans, sent a letter to his fellow commander that he should kill 
Shahrvaraz and bring the army back to fight Heraclius. The Byzantines apparently 
captured the messenger and they used this to convince Shahrvaraz to renounce 
Khusrau II and make a separate agreement with Heraclius.299
On the face of it, this story would seem to show that Shahrvaraz abandoned Khusrau 
to his fate. The problem is that, while there certainly was a meeting between 
Shahrvaraz and Heraclius, Sebeos indicated that it occurred later, after the death of 
Kavad-Siroes, and that it was the occasion when Shahrvaraz promised to remove his 
army from the conquered territories and return the fragments of the True Cross still 
in Persian hands in exchange for aid in his own attempt at becoming . 300
It is more likely, based on this, that it was this meeting that Theophanes meant, and 
that Shahrvaraz did not meet Heraclius prior to this. While this might not seem to 
have much impact on the relations between king and nobility, it does allow for 
another approach to the events of the coup itself.
By 628, the two empires had been at war for twenty-five years. The nobility can be 
divided into two groups. One consists of those who have been fighting in the 
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campaigns against the Romans either as generals, such as Shahrvaraz and Shahin, or 
as and part of other elite units. These would be the ones who were 
gaining the most benefits of the war, as they would receive the plunder that was not 
reserved for the king and were the most likely to be rewarded with new land if the 
war was won. On the other hand, these were also the nobles who were most likely to 
be punished for the recent defeats that the Persian armies had suffered in the field. In 
fact, Sebeos related that Khusrau ‘began to gather the surviving nobles and 
addressed them with fearsome condemnations’.301 These nobles were the survivors 
from the battle of Nineveh, but a similar occurrence may have appeared all too 
possible to the nobles who were part of the other defeated armies.  
This lends itself well to a comparison with the earlier revolt of Bahram Chobin, 
although there are differences in the circumstances. While both Bahram and 
Shahrvaraz were generals who rebelled against their king due to a defeat in battle 
which they felt may have led to punishment, Shahrvaraz did not march upon the 
capital, either to support the rebellious nobles, to aid the king in the hope of a pardon 
or to defend it against the encroaching Byzantine army. This may appear odd at first 
glance, but there were factors in play that prevented Shahrvaraz from acting directly. 
According to Sebeos,302 his army was encamped north of Lake Van in the province 
of Aliovit before he marched them west to Anatolia to rest and regroup. Thus he 
would have been at least 500 miles away from Ctesiphon and probably more. It 
would have taken a messenger some time to find him, riding through the mountains 
in winter and having to avoid any Byzantine patrols. Further, once Shahrvaraz knew 
of events, it would have taken an army even longer to make the same trip with no 
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guarantee that he would arrive in time to influence events at the definite cost of 
having to uproot his soldiers from comparatively comfortable winter quarters. 
Finally, to move his army would have meant essentially giving the Persian western 
conquests back to the Byzantines, and as can be seen from later developments, 
Shahrvaraz was unwilling to do so.
Returning to the comparison with the uprising of Bahram, in both cases, the coup 
itself was undertaken by parties within the court on behalf of the heir apparent. As 
earlier with Khusrau, it is impossible to determine with certainty whether the 
principal architect of events was Kavad-Siroes or the nobles who conspired with 
him. Theophanes implied that Kavad-Siroes was the first to speak of revolt and he is 
the most reliable source on these events.303 On the other hand, Movses Daskhurants’i 
named a noble ‘who was protector of the first-born of [Khusrau] who was called 
Kavad’304 as the one who started the plot on behalf of Kavad-Siroes, while al-Tabari 
specifically said that ‘the Persians rose up against [Khusrau] and killed him, aided by 
his son [Kavad-Siroes], son of Maryam al-Rumiyyah’.305 In short, there are 
arguments to be made in favour of both interpretations, and reasons for both parties 
to have made the first move. In the case of the fall of Hormizd IV, the coup was led 
by the disaffected nobles in favour of Khusrau II, but as mentioned above, the 
circumstances were very different. 
Another part of the puzzle is the religious affiliations of the various parties. While 
Khusrau had certainly supported Christians in the early part of his reign, he was 
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married to at least one and probably two Christians; and some of his chief officials 
were also Christians.306 The  made Kavad-Siroes the son of Maria, which 
is certainly possible given the limited evidence.307 All that can be extracted from the 
relevant parts of the other sources is that he was a son of Khusrau and probably not a 
son of Shirin, due to him not being identified with her in places where it would have 
been easier to list him with her son Merdanshah.308 What is certain is that Kavad-
Siroes was older than Merdanshah and apparently had closer links with the nobility 
or at least their sons than his rival.309 One possible suggestion why this might be the 
case is that Kavad-Siroes claimed to favour a course true to the Zoroastrian origins 
of the Sassanid dynasty while Merdanshah had become associated with his mother’s 
Christianity and his father’s failure. Given that Maria does not appear much in even 
those sources where she is mentioned, it is possible that her son (if Kavad-Siroes was 
actually her son) had rejected her faith at least outwardly and there is nothing to 
suggest that he favoured the Christians during his short reign. 
This raises the question of the very reason that Theophanes gave for the revolt – that 
Khusrau had planned to disinherit Kavad-Siroes in favour of Merdanshah whom he 
intended to crown.310 It is true that there was at least one precedent for this in the 
history of the dynasty – Ardashir I had made his son, Shapur I, co-ruler for a period 
as can be seen from coinage bearing the heads of both men. However, this came 
towards the end of Ardashir’s reign, shortly before his death. Thus, this may be 
explained by Shapur continuing the fighting on the frontiers while Ardashir dealt 
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with matters closer to home. Regardless, the situation was utterly different from that 
facing Khusrau II. Nothing in the only source to mention the incident, Theophanes, 
suggests that he was preparing to abdicate and doing so in the middle of the crisis 
would have been foolish. None of the other sources even suggest that he was 
planning to crown Merdanshah. However, as referred to above, Theophanes 
provided the basic narrative structure. So, how to explain this seeming contradiction? 
To explain it, it is necessary to look at the list of complaints that al-Tabari had 
Kavad-Siroes send to Khusrau explaining why he was overthrown. The first one is as 
follows:311
Your crime against your father [Hormizd], your violence toward him, 
depriving him of the royal power, blinding his eyes, killing him in a most 
horrible fashion, and all the great burden of guilt you have brought upon 
yourself by injuring him.
Now, here Kavad-Siroes is deploring the very idea of overthrowing a king, let alone 
having him blinded and then executed, and yet that is exactly what he does to his 
own father. While this may have been acceptable to the nobles on the spot, it might 
not have been so easy to convince the Emperor Heraclius of that, particularly not 
after the entire Persian justification for the war had hinged on the murder of 
Maurice.312 And while we, with the benefit of hindsight, know that Heraclius was 
later happy to make a bargain with Shahrvaraz to seize the throne of Persia in 
exchange for the return of the True Cross, it is perhaps understandable that Kavad-
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Siroes did not wish to risk the survival of his kingdom on it.313 Thus, he may have 
lied to the Emperor, claiming that the violation of his right of primogeniture was the 
reason for his overthrow of his own father and his later execution – despite this 
practice not being the case in Sassanid Persia – thus bringing it in line with 
Heraclius’ own overthrow of the usurper Phocas.
This would also explain why Theophanes presented Kavad-Siroes as the leader of 
the movement so definitely.314 After all, the overthrow of a king, even a hated 
Persian , by his own nobility would not be a movement that a Byzantine 
emperor could support. On the other hand, Kavad-Siroes seems to have had the best 
claim to the throne and thus his participation was easier to explain. Finally, if he was 
the son of a Byzantine woman, then Heraclius might have calculated that he was 
more likely to be sympathetic to his goals than Khusrau himself or one of his other 
sons.
Regardless, Theophanes also made an interesting statement regarding the 
participants in the conspiracy. Rather than, as al-Tabari stated,315 just naming them 
Persians or even, as Sebeos did,316 the nobles, he specified that they were the sons of 
nobles, including the son of Aram along with others, whom he did not name.317 This 
lends credence to the theory that the coup was engineered by the cabal about Kavad-
Siroes formed by the younger nobles of his own age who would benefit most from 
his coming to power, rather than the older generation, which had already been 
thinned by years of war. Further, while the participation of Shahrvaraz’s sons might 
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seem to indicate his own involvement, that is not necessarily the case. After all, the 
limits on communications applied equally and it is just as likely that his sons 
responded to his fall from favour by attempting to remove Khusrau II. The level of 
detail that Theophanes presented here is the principal reason why he is considered 
the best source on this incident.
Again, there is the potential to see how the different factions within the Sassanid 
court are linked back to the mothers of the competing princes. Due to the chaos of 
the Byzantine invasion, any process of succession that may or may not have existed 
was no longer functional. In truth, it seems that the process of succession relied upon 
the prestige of the king decreeing it and the ability of his successor to take and hold 
the throne against any siblings who might challenge him for it or any nobles that 
wished to be the power behind the . In particular, one of the first actions 
of Kavad-Siroes was the execution of all his brothers.318 Theophanes here said 
‘siblings’ or ‘all his other children’ rather than brothers,319 but this is likely to be an 
error. At least two of Khusrau’s other children, the princesses Purandokht and 
Azarmidukht, survived to reign in their own right in later years although these may 
have been Kavad-Siroes’ full sisters and the daughters of Maria, the Byzantine wife 
of Khusrau, which would tie into a theory based upon amphimetrism.320 In addition, 
the parents of both Ardashir III and of Yazdgird III are uncertain, although the 
former was probably the son of Kavad-Siroes and the latter the son of Shahriyar who 
may have been a son of Khusrau and Shirin,321 and thus the survival of at least some 
other children of Khusrau II cannot be ruled out. Furthermore, none of them, again 
                                                  
318 Movses Daskhuranst’i II.12-13 (from
 p.219); Theophanes A.M. 6118; Sebeos 127; al-Tabari 1060.
319 in the Greek.
320 Sebeos 130 and al-Tabari 1064-1066.
321 Theophanes A.M. 6118.
Shahanshah
 The Roman Eastern Frontier and the Persian Wars Part II 
AD 363-630
?e??a 
113
excepting the , mention the fate of Shirin.322 This is revealing on several 
levels. First, as Movses Daskhuranst’i wrote, Kavad-Siroes may have had his 
brothers mutilated before resorting to murder.323 In theory, this would have barred 
them from taking the throne, for the  had to attain a certain physical 
standard, although the details are unknown as to what that standard might have been. 
A comparison might be made to the Byzantine practice of slitting the tongues or 
noses of fallen Emperors prior to sending them to a monastery – it saved the usurper 
from the odium of having to execute an Emperor or a member of the Imperial family, 
but still allowed for a certain measure of security. While the same seems to have held 
true in Sassanid Persia, the standards were rather different as can be seen by the 
problems that Khusrau I had with his brothers, one of whom should have been barred 
from the throne by his physical deformities.324  Given this precedent, it is perhaps 
not surprising that Kavad-Siroes chose the simpler and bloodier expedient of killing 
his brothers as noted in the sources, and it is probable that the nobles who had 
supported him concurred with this course of action.
There is almost nothing that can be said about the nobility in the reign of Kavad-
Siroes that has not already been mentioned. The sources for his reign are brief in the 
extreme, and primarily deal with the fall of Khusrau and his relations with the 
Romans. The former have been noted already and the latter have little bearing on the 
debate at hand. There is one exception. During the reign of Kavad-Siroes, 
Shahrvaraz remained in Byzantine territory despite orders to the contrary.325 Quite 
simply, the  lacked the ability to bring his rogue general to heel and this 
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may be seen as a harbinger of things to come. After all, if the king could not control 
one general, how could he or his successors expect to control the others?
Another point of interest, already briefly touched upon, is the issue of Christianity 
and Zoroastrianism. While it is difficult to say with certainty what position Kavad-
Siroes took on religion due to the brief time for which he reigned, there is enough 
information to make such a judgement on one of his successors. Shahrvaraz became 
 following the deaths of Kavad-Siroes and his successor Ardashir III. In 
the writings of Nicephorus I, he stated that, at a meeting between Heraclius and 
Shahrvaraz to discuss his bid for the Persian crown, ‘Heraclius conferred the dignity 
of patrician upon Nicetas, the son of Shahrvaraz, and gave the latter’s daughter Nike 
in marriage to his own son Theodosius, born of Martina’.326 Both Nike and Nicetas 
are Greek rather than Persian in origin, which would suggest that they, if not 
Shahrvaraz himself, were Christians. In this light, the murder of Shahrvaraz after 
only forty days on the throne becomes rather easier to explain.327 After all, the fact 
that he was not a member of the house of Sassan was unlikely to be the sole problem 
as the same had been true of Bahram Chobin, and in any case there was no male 
Sassanid prince of an age to rule independently, as the successor to Shahrvaraz was 
Purandokht, daughter of Khusrau II. In any case, the notion of a Christian sitting 
upon the throne of Persia would have been unthinkable to the Zoroastrian priests and 
probably to the nobility. It is true that some of the previous  had shown 
tolerance to the Christians, but there was a wide gap between that and accepting one
as ruler, particularly if there was the chance that he would found his own dynasty –
in short, Shahrvaraz could easily have become a Persian Constantine, and that would 
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probably have shattered what was left of the Sassanid state. In addition, he had either 
murdered or been responsible for the death of the young Ardashir III (or was 
perceived to be) and a combination of the above was probably the reason why he 
was murdered by a soldier so quickly. While there is no direct evidence that the 
nobility had a hand in it, it is extremely likely given the suppositions above that they 
at the very least did not discourage it. After all, Shahrvaraz had the potential to be an 
extremely effective ruler and, as can be seen in the following reigns, the nobility 
preferred a ruler that they could manipulate.
In conclusion, the events surrounding the fall of Khusrau II and his immediate 
successors are often mentioned briefly by historians as an aftermath to his reign and 
a prelude to the final fall of their Empire twenty years later.328 More in-depth 
analyses tend to revolve around the relations with the Byzantine Empire rather than 
the internal politics of Persia, perhaps because the events seem so clear at first 
reading. However, in fact there is a great deal that a closer examination of these 
events can contribute to an understanding of the balance of power between the king 
and his nobles and it serves in some ways as an eerie mirror of the fall of Hormizd 
IV forty years previously. In brief, it is clear from the portrayal in the sources that a 
primary part was played in the deposition of Khusrau by the nobility. If not the 
primary motivators, they took a large role in the coup itself and its aftermath. There 
are deep implications for the success or otherwise of the reforms of Khusrau I to be 
read into this, particularly whether they were actually as successful as some 
historians like to infer at tipping the balance in favour of the . Certainly, 
to say that the power of the traditional nobility was ‘broken once and for all’ at any 
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point in Sassanid history is to ignore the fact that they continued to play a key role in 
politics until the end, and indeed gained in power as the house of Sassan 
weakened.329 This can partly be attributed to external factors, but the lack of a strong 
successor to Khusrau II certainly played its part.
By then, however, it was too late to save the situation. The army, which had 
contributed so materially to the greatness of the dynasty, in the end brought 
about its downfall. The generals treated the provinces of which they were 
governors as their own fiefs in a manner that strikingly recalls the 
independent attitude of the satraps in the last days of the Achaemenian 
Empire. The Sassanid Empire crumbled away and disintegrated into a 
collection of petty states which are precisely enumerated by the Arab 
historians. No group or individual was capable of opposing the Arab 
advance. The new aristocracy created by [Khusrau] I was not as yet 
established and could provide no support for the tottering throne of a 
discredited family. Everything foundered under the onslaught of the 
uncivilised Beduin.330
With this passage, Ghirshman began to draw a veil over the end of Sassanid Persia, 
naming the cause of its defeat and downfall as the failure of the army and the 
nobility to unite around the House of Sassan in its hour of need, resulting in the 
collapse of both the state and of the dynasty that had ruled it for the last four hundred 
years. Weariness is often a factor in accounts of the end of Sassanid rule, in one form 
or another, be it the result of the long war with Byzantium that had resulted in large 
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casualties and vast parts of the western provinces being devastated or the proposed 
disaffection of the lower orders of society for both the Zoroastrian clergy and the 
nobility or even the nobility becoming separated from the ruling family. Even in 
more modern works, a variation on this theme can be found – Frye treated the 
Sassanid empire in this period much like the countries of the Middle Ages with an 
impotent king striving and failing to impose his will on the great feudal lords, whose 
power eclipsed his own.331 However, while the medieval period had nations move 
from this stereotype to being centralised monarchies where the ruler held near 
absolute power, this trend seems to have reversed itself in the Sassanid Empire.
Here, the prevailing orthodoxy is that the reigns of Khusrau I and, to a lesser extent, 
Khusrau II were the peak of the power of the king as opposed to his nobility. 
Following the reign of Khusrau II, it is traditional to view the rulers as pawns of 
others – be it Heraclius in the case of Shahrvaraz or the Persian nobility for the 
sisters Purandokht and Azarmidukht.332 However, while this is certainly the route 
marked by some of the sources – particularly in the case of Shahrvaraz, where his 
debt to the Byzantine Emperor is present in most accounts,333 the sources recording 
the reigns of the two sisters and of Yazdgird III are generally not especially detailed 
on the subject of internal Persian affairs.334 Most of the Byzantine sources narrate 
primarily the arenas where Sassanids and Byzantines interact, and these were 
surprisingly few following the brief rule of Shahrvaraz. The war may have played a 
major role in this separation as neither state seems to have wished to renew the 
conflict or even to negotiate with the other – unsurprisingly perhaps, as there may 
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have been considerable bitterness on both sides and at all levels of society. Not 
everyone, after all, would have wanted to sign peace in 591 or 628 and it is likely 
that many Persians wished to repay the enemy in the West for the shame of such a 
decisive defeat. Of course, the lack of contemporary Persian sources prevents a 
definite comment either way on this subject, but the transition from what must have 
seemed like total victory on all fronts for most of the war to defeat by a last minute 
Byzantine counter attack must have been devastating. Besides this, there was the 
shame that those nobles more concerned with the state of their country must have felt 
at the disarray immediately following its defeat.
It is true, as shown elsewhere, that there was great confusion in Persia during this 
period, for which the traditional explanation is that the nobles deliberately took 
advantage of the weakened central power to usurp it for themselves in their own 
domains.335 However, as with much of the history of Persia in this era, there are gaps 
in our sources. It may be considered that there was a difference between the 
provincial nobility, whether they held land on a frontier or had been assigned a post 
such as , and those who were to be found at court. Of course, the court was 
to be found where the  was, and the culture expressed in the art of the 
Sassanid dynasty shows that it was a martial culture at least in part, so all of the 
nobility would have known how to fight and hunt, even if those skills were not put 
into use very frequently. It is less likely that this distinction was recognised by the 
Persians, although it may have been more pronounced during times of war at least in 
terms of political alignments. There are definite signs at times, such as with the 
depositions of both Hormizd IV and Khusrau II, of family playing a crucial role, but 
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not generally of regional affiliations. From the presentation of the tale of Smbat 
Bagratuni in Sebeos, it appears that the principle  were placed in areas 
other than their homes to prevent precisely this type of rival power base being 
established.336 Of course, as with any period of Sassanid history, this relied upon the 
ability of the king to see his orders through should the noble in question resist. The 
case for the decentralisation of Sassanid power in this period often bases part of their 
claims upon the perceived weakness of the successors of Khusrau II and the short 
lived nature of their reigns.337 However, this is not entirely supported by evidence. It 
is true that, of the rulers that succeeded Khusrau, most did not survive the year. 
Yazdgird III was the exception and may well have been able to reverse the trend if 
he had been given the opportunity to do so. 
One particular point of discontinuity between the scenario we are presented with by 
the sources, such as al-Tabari, and the interpretation placed upon it by scholars is 
related both to the perceived war-weariness and to the willingness of the nobility to 
risk their lives for the House of Sassan during the Arab invasions. An oft repeated 
theme is that of devastation, where Persia and Byzantium alike are shown to be 
ravaged countries which were unable to resist the Muslim attacks as they might have 
done otherwise.338 This ignores the fact that the Persians were able to put at least 
three armies into the field against the Arabs at al-Qadisiyyah in 636, at Jalula later 
that year and again at Nihawand in 642.339 While the size of an army is always 
questionable in sources, al-Tabari implied that a considerable Persian force was 
available in all three cases, although the armies were shattered in the aftermath of the 
                                                  
336 Sebeos 96-97.
337 Dignas and Winter 2007: 48.
338 Garthwaite 2005: 111-112.
339 Al-Tabari 2294, 2359, 2598.
marzbans
120
two battles.340 In addition, this assumes that the forces deployed at al-Qadisiyyah 
were those which had been fighting on the frontier since the beginning of the 630s 
and which had won the Battle of the Bridge the year before, a success often not 
mentioned besides the defeats at al-Qadisiyyah and elsewhere. Thus, whatever the 
state of the elite units of  and others, there was still the potential for 
large and effective Persian armies to be raised until the end of the dynasty. In 
addition, while the western armies had been shattered by the constant fighting 
against the Byzantines with the exception of those commanded by Shahrvaraz, there 
is no evidence that the same was true of the eastern frontiers and the 
would seem to suggest that the eastern forces remained intact as late as the murder of 
Yazdgird in 651.341 What may be argued is that there was a lack of veterans to train 
the new recruits and to support them in battle. Thus the Muslims may have faced 
large numbers of levied infantry, supported by the remains of the regular army and 
the heavy cavalry. However, the fact that the king was able to assemble three armies 
each of which is likely to have outnumbered the Muslim army opposing it suggests 
that the people, including the nobility were loyal to him and his House.342 It is not 
until after al-Qadisiyyah that we hear of units defecting to the Muslim cause en 
masse and not until after Nihawand that towns and cities began to change sides 
without resisting.343 While al-Qadisiyyah certainly allowed the Muslim armies to 
penetrate the inner area of the Sassanid Empire, it was the defeat at Nihawand that 
marked the destruction of the Sassanid army.344 Following this, any resistance was 
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mounted by the inhabitants of an area on their own against the invaders. Therefore, it 
appears that the nobility remained loyal to the royal family until, in some cases, the 
bitter end. Both Garthwaite345 and Frye346 comment on the evidence in Chinese 
sources for a continuing Sassanid presence in the areas to the east, including China, 
following the fall of their Empire and this would seem to suggest that it was more 
than a single prince who fled there. In addition, both authors also mention that the 
tombstone of a Persian woman of the Suren family was found there dating to the late 
ninth century. Clearly not all of the nobility had abandoned the Sassanids even at the 
end. 
Another often remarked upon factor is the suggested lack of appeal that 
Zoroastrianism had for the common people of the realm, at least as practised by the 
Magian priesthood and the nobility.347 However, it is difficult to be certain of this. It 
is true that many Zoroastrians seem to have converted to the Muslim cause based on 
accounts in al-Tabari and other Muslim accounts; however, these declarations would 
be more convincing were it not for the degree to which such accounts are prone to 
exaggerate many facts about the Arab success. Further, such sources were written 
after the conquests and thus there is always the possibility that the collapse of 
support for the Sassanid dynasty has been emphasised and the degree of resistance to 
the inevitable triumph of Islam played down. Certainly, a common theme among 
historians is that the battle of al-Qadisiyyah marked the end of the Sassanid Empire 
in every respect bar the most obvious and that there was no way that the Empire 
could survive following it. In fact, the end was only truly reached at Nihawand, five 
years later, and either battle could have stopped the process of Islamic conquest in its 
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tracks, at least on the Persian front. Finally, the Persians at the time clearly felt that 
they had sufficient investment, be it physical or emotional, with the dynasty to fight 
for it as long as they could. While this may not be reflected in the sources, this is 
again possibly due to the lack of Persians writing contemporary history or the 
Muslim tendency to imply that their victory was inevitable. It is difficult, from this 
distance, to argue with that, although, as demonstrated earlier, clearly it was not the 
view at the time. Inevitable victories tend only to be viewed in that light after the 
event – as can be seen from more modern conflicts, such as World War II.
In short, the bulk of the Persian nobility, and possibly even the populace as a whole, 
retained ties to the House of Sassan as long as was practical. In comparison, the 
larger Achaemenid Empire crumbled in a much shorter time and with much less 
ongoing resistance, although there were mitigating factors there. Even so, the fact 
that there were major nobles who were willing to go into exile with the remainder of 
the royal family suggests that there were powerful families who felt that the 
Sassanids were, whatever their flaws, a far better proposition than these Bedouin 
tribesmen from out of the desert, who, according to al-Tabari, propagated notions 
that all men were equal and that wealth was unimportant even when faced with all 
the splendour and glory of Sassanid Persia.348 Such men were dangerous. When 
faced with a choice between the rule of Shahrvaraz and one of the daughters of 
Khusrau II, someone preferred the rule of a queen who was at least of the House of 
Sassan to a battle hardened general who was not. How can those who held such 
sentiments have viewed the coming of a band of Muslims, who were not even 
Persians let alone Zoroastrians? One suspects that they did not approve of it, which 
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was what led to the exodus of some at least to the east and of others to fight until the 
end in what proved to be an ultimately futile struggle to preserve the last Sassanid 
monarch.
124
C O N C L U S I O N
The relationship between the  of Sassanid Persia and their most 
powerful subjects is not an easy one to characterise simply, or indeed at all. A great 
part of this problem is the lack of source material, which is notably slender, even for 
Persian history, and the spread of this material over many years and traditions. 
Furthermore, the lack of interest that many writers of the ancient world show for 
topics that modern historians would find fascinating can be frustrating, Agathias and 
his misuse of the Sassanid archives for example.349 However, despite these setbacks, 
it is possible to assemble an argument about how the kings interacted with their chief 
nobles, particularly in the later period. As always, some extrapolation is needed in 
places and there is the need with certain events to determine which account is the 
most accurate or the least biased. 
The hub around which this thesis turns is the reign of Khusrau I, and more 
specifically the reforms that he may have undertaken. It is these that are seen by 
historians such as Dignas and Winter to be the point of change from a nobility that 
was independently powerful of the  to one that had lost the bulk of its 
ability to resist the will of the king.350 However, it is impossible to determine the 
exact balance of power before, during or after the reign of Khusrau I. The nature of 
the surviving evidence is such that only scattered examples survive, most of which 
are from times of upheaval where the normal relationship was not in evidence.  What 
is possible is to build an idea of how this balance changed or failed to change across 
the existence of the Sassanid Empire. 
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The first chapter of this thesis dealt with the time before Khusrau I as well as the first 
years of his reign. It covers the longest period – almost three hundred years of the 
dynasty. This is due to the lack of evidence from the third to fifth centuries, with a 
few exceptions. Fortunately, the examples of the career of the priest Kartir,351 those 
portions of the reign of Shapur II as described in Ammianus Marcellinus352 and the 
reign of Kavad353 provide enough material for a comparison. The nobles and priests 
of the early years were seemingly generally loyal to their king so long as he 
remained successful and provided them with the opportunities that they sought. As 
such, they commanded armies, led embassies and any number of activities on behalf 
of the . However, when they felt that their interests were threatened, they 
were more than capable of acting to protect them. The obvious example is the 
overthrow and imprisonment of Kavad,354 but the same happened to Shapur III who 
was murdered rather than merely imprisoned.355
It is not disputed that the nobility of this period wielded great power. Indeed, it can 
be overestimated – the great campaigns were led by the  in person well 
into the sixth century. Nor were the nobility overly restless in the grand scheme of 
events. It was in their interests to allow the king to conduct the campaigns against the 
Romans, as it was these campaigns that filled their coffers and allowed them to 
display their bravery in the traditional manner. Of course, the insight into these 
matters is limited by what the sources chose to pass down, but the tradition 
represented by al-Tabari provided at least some information about each Sassanid 
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ruler, even those for which the contemporary sources were silent or no longer in 
existence.
Armed with a vague summary of their reign at the least, it is feasible to decide 
whether any of the incidents listed are relevant to the question at hand. In many 
cases, they are not. The particular details of events at court that would be invaluable 
to a modern historian would either not be of interest or not be available to an ancient 
writer. Even if archives were kept, as the Sassanids did, these would be unlikely to 
be as detailed as we might wish and they do not survive in any event. 
Moving on, the second chapter was concerned with the reforms themselves. Before 
returning to that though, the third chapter looked at the remainder of the Sassanid 
dynasty, from Hormizd IV to Yazdgird III. Here there is a much greater 
concentration of sources than the early years, covering a number of events in some 
detail, although still not as great as is first thought or desirable. These include the 
events surrounding the overthrow of Hormizd IV and accession of Khusrau II356 and 
the later coup against Khusrau II.357 Other interesting occurrences were the short 
reign of Shahrvaraz358 and the little we know about the Islamic conquests. It is from 
these events that the fallacy of the belief that the nobility was rendered powerless 
after the reforms of Khusrau I becomes apparent. The nobility and the great houses 
retained the ability to overthrow the  should they so wish. In fact, they 
exercised that ability twice in only thirty years successfully. 
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One aspect that does stand out even here is the lack of any alternate candidates for 
the throne. Bahram Chobin managed to secure it for a short period, but there is no 
evidence that his claim was recognised by the other nobles, and some at least 
remained with Khusrau II.359 Shahrvaraz took power for an even shorter period, but 
was then assassinated by one of his own men.360  Other than them, all the rulers came 
from the House of Sassan. Despite the catastrophic defeat, there was no revolt, such 
as that against the last Arsacid king, and the nobility as a whole seems to have 
remained loyal to their rulers, even if they took issue with some of them. 
The middle chapter took the reforms of Khusrau I as its central premise. This may 
have seemed unusual in a thesis centring on the king and his nobles, particularly 
when the chapter itself dealt with the reforms to the exclusion of the nobility. 
However, it has been contended by Dignas and Winter that the reforms broke the 
power of the nobility,361 while Rubin has argued that the reforms were successful 
only until the death of Khusrau I, and possibly not even that long.362 However, the 
text of the reforms quoted at length in the second chapter indicates a more 
conservative approach than is widely acknowledged, more interested in the 
restoration of the state and with reminiscing upon a golden age than in innovation 
and novelty.363 Perhaps it is the reference in Procopius to Khusrau being fond of 
innovation that has led to this,364 but the reforms as they have survived do not appear 
entirely innovative. As always, the lack of contemporary evidence remains the 
greatest obstacle to a full appreciation of the reforms.
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It is only in combination with the evidence from the other two chapters that the 
context within which the reforms must be placed emerges fully. The sources that 
survive do not indicate any notable differences in how the nobility act before, during 
or after the reign of Khusrau I. Nor do the kings appear to have treated them any 
differently before or after. The  remained the sole master of the Persian 
Empire and the great houses remained his chief subjects, from which were drawn the 
leaders of his armies ( ), his diplomats and governors of the provinces 
( ). It would be unusual if this were not true, for who else could the King of 
Kings call upon to fill the roles necessary to maintain the functioning of the 
kingdom? Certain roles could be filled by outsiders or the newly empowered 
 but only the high ranking nobles had the experience in leading armies to 
war or in commanding the defence of a province that might fall under Byzantine 
attack. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the nobles present at court were those 
whom the  would be aware of, and of whom he might perhaps have 
some knowledge. It would have been unlikely for the King of Kings to entrust an 
important command or mission to a man he had not met. Further, after the 
experience of the Mazdakites, it would be a brave (and probably short lived) 
 who contemplated the dismissal of the traditional nobles in favour of a 
lower class. It is clear from Theophylact’s writing that the tale of the fall of Kavad 
was still well known by the end of the sixth century.365 In short, it would have been 
in the interests of neither side to attempt to change the situation.
The relationship between the kings of Sassanid Persia and their nobility was most 
certainly one that flowed both ways. The king gave his nobles power and prestige in 
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addition to the recognition due their station and accomplishments. As seen from the 
cases of Smbat Bagratuni366 and Seoses,367 service to the  was the most 
important indicator of worth, and success would have offered vast rewards. In return, 
the nobility remained loyal to the dynasty without wavering through almost the 
entirety of the four centuries that the House of Sassan reigned over Persia.  This 
should not be taken as meaning that the nobility formed a single united block, for 
there are clear indications that they did not. The ideal relationship was one of 
exchange, but there was change throughout the period. Strong or successful kings 
could garner stronger allegiance than weak monarchs, but their strength could 
disappear if events conspired against them, as shown with Khusrau II.368 Religion 
also played a role. A Zoroastrian was more likely to be popular with his nobles than 
a ruler who openly favoured Christians or heretics.369
It is impossible for an historian to be absolutely certain about the exact nature of this 
relationship. The information is not available for such precise details. What is 
possible, and what this thesis has set out to examine, is the change or otherwise in 
the relationship over the course of the Sassanid Empire using such examples as we 
have. The conclusion to be drawn is that, whatever the intended outcome of the 
reforms of Khusrau I, they did not alter the balance of power between the king and 
his nobles in any meaningful way. Indeed, it appears as if they were never intended 
to alter it. Instead, the reforms were used to restore Persian society to stability 
following a period of internal unrest as a result of the activities of the Mazdakite 
sect. 
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It is possible that Khusrau I intended these reforms to create a bureaucracy to oppose 
the power of the nobility; however, even if this was proven to be the case, it needs to 
be seen in the light of similar attempts by several other  to do the same. 
It is not clear that this was the case though, for the reforms as presented by al-Tabari 
do not seem to have had the intention of creating or expanding the bureaucracy 
beyond what must have already existed in some form.370 There is the implication of 
greater organisation – the changes to the tax system371 and to the cavalry372 in 
particular – but that is far from being the same.
Thus, to conclude, there was no overall change to the mechanics of the relationship 
between the kings of Sassanid Persia and their chief nobles during the dynasty’s 
reign. There were of course alterations in the manner in which particular rulers and 
specific nobles did so, but a difference must be seen between those details which we 
are not in a position to know and the wider sweep, or context, of their association 
which can be determined from examination of the source material. The former was 
mutable and ever-changing, as any relationship is. The latter, however, may be safely 
said to have remained unchanged throughout the reign of the Sassanid dynasty.
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